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(Acts whose publication is not obligatory)
COMMISSION
COMMISSION DECISION
of 20 June 2001
relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the EC Treaty
(COMP/E-2/36.041/PO — Michelin)
(notified under document number C(2001) 1582)
(Only the French text is authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2002/405/EC)
After having consulted the Advisory Committee on Restrictive
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Practices and Dominant Positions,
Whereas:Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity,
I. FACTS
Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February
1962, first Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty (1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1216/
1999 (2), and in particular Articles 3(1) and 15(2) thereof,
A. THE UNDERTAKING
Having regard to Commission’s Decision of 28 June 1999 to
(1) The Michelin group, with a net turnover of EURopen proceedings in this case, 13,763 billion (FRF 90,28 billion) in 1999 and a world
market share (all tyre types combined) of more than
18 %, is in competition with the Japanese Bridgestone
group and the Goodyear/Sumitomo alliance for worldHaving given the undertakings concerned the opportunity of
leadership in the tyre field. In the Community, Michelinbeing heard on the matters to which the Commission has
is by far the largest tyremaker, with a market sharetaken objection, in accordance with Article 19(1) of Regulation
(approximately 32 %) almost twice as large as that of itsNo 17 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 2842/98 of
closest competitor, Goodyear/Sumitomo. In France, it is22 December 1998 on the hearing of parties in certain
in a commanding position, with market shares whichproceedings under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (3),
can be estimated at [...] (*) of the total (all tyres com-
bined).
(1) OJ L 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204/62.
(2) OJ L 148, 15.6.1999, p. 5.
(3) OJ L 354, 30.12.1998, p. 18. (*) Business secrets have been omitted from the text.
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B. PROCEDURE the part of buyers of car tyres and that on the part of
buyers of truck tyres. A large and growing part of car
tyre distribution is effected through maintenance and
service centres, car centres and superstores, which cover(2) In May 1996 the Commission opened an own-initiative
only a very small part of the truck tyre market. Truckproceeding against Michelin. It had evidence suggesting
tyres are for their part distributed mainly by specialisedthat the firm was abusing its dominant position on the
dealers.French market for replacement tyres for heavy vehicles
by imposing on dealers unfair business conditions based
inter alia on a complex system of fidelity rebates aimed
at tying those dealers closely to it. A number of detailed
(7) These types of tyre also differ in terms of their unit price.requests for information were sent to Michelin, its
For the most common dimensions, truck and bus tyrecompetitors and tyre dealers and importers. An investi-
prices are more than five times higher than those of cargation under Article 14(3) of Regulation No 17 was
tyres. There is no substitutability of supply betweencarried out at Michelin’s premises in France in June
truck and bus tyres and the other types. According to1997. On 28 June 1999 the Commission sent a
Michelin, ‘the resources employed to design and producestatement of objections to Michelin. A hearing of the
truck and bus tyres are radically different from thoseparties (Michelin and the interested party Bandag Inc.)
required to manufacture the other types of tyre’ (4) (typestook place on 20 December 1999.
of machine-tool, specific workshops, rubber com-
pounds, requisite properties, standards to be met).
C. THE PRODUCT
2. THE NEW TYRE
(3) The tyre industry comprises the manufacture of inner
tubes and outer casings (or carcasses), and the renewal
of the tread on worn tyre casings. This Decision concerns
(8) The tyre market can be divided into two sectorsonly the manufacture of outer casings and the renewal
depending on the type of consumer that is beingof the tread on worn tyre casings.
targeted. A clear distinction must be drawn between the
two. On the one hand there is the original equipment
market, and on the other the replacement market.
(4) To understand what a tyre is, three main distinctions
must be drawn:
(9) Original equipment tyres are sold by the tyre manufac-
turer direct to the vehicle producer, without passing
1. THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF TYRE through an intermediary. Replacement tyres, on the
other hand, are sold to the final consumer primarily
through a large number of specialised commercial
outlets. Truck tyres are thus distributed mainly via(5) First of all, a distinction must be made between different
specialised tyre dealers. The presence of thesesorts of tyre designed for different types of vehicle:
middlemen, who obtain their supplies either from the
manufacturer or from wholesalers or official importers,
— light tyres for cars, distinguishes the replacement tyre market clearly from
the original equipment tyre market.
— tyres for delivery vans and light commercial
vehicles,
3. THE RETREADED TYRE— heavy tyres for trucks and buses,
— tyres for agricultural tractors, road-building and
earth-moving machinery, aircraft, etc. (10) Truck and bus tyres need not necessarily be new.
Provided the casing is in a sound condition, used tyres
may be given a new tread. In some cases it is possible to
repeat the retreading process. Retreading is carried out(6) Each type of tyre covers a wide range of different
not only by the tyre manufacturers themselves (inqualities, treads and sizes. The type of tyre chosen
obviously depends first and foremost on the type of
vehicle to which it is to be fitted and the purpose for
which the vehicle is to be used. Car tyres and truck and
bus tyres are not interchangeable. There are, moreover,
major differences between the structure of demand on (4) Michelin’s reply to the Article 11 letter of 3.12.1996.
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France, for example, Michelin is the largest retreader of the mould-cure/precure distinction is never mentioned
as it has no impact on prices and competition. In Europecommercial vehicle tyres), but also by many firms
specialising in the process. firms using the different systems compete with one
another.
(11) There are two retreading systems: mould-cure and
precure.
(16) Overall, transport firms in Europe and in France in
(12) Mould-cure retreading consists in applying new tread particular currently fit new tyres and retreaded tyres in
rubber to the tyre casing, which is then hot-cured in a roughly equal proportions. The figures vary consider-
dedicated facility. This system, by which it is possible ably, however, from one country to another. In Finland,
to replace the tread, calls for mastery of new-tyre for example, retreaded tyres account for 74,3 % of all
manufacturing techniques and tools and for that reason tyres sold, while in Spain the corresponding figure is a
is used only by industrial enterprises. It also calls for an mere 37,3 %.
elaborate system for collecting casings, and involves
transport constraints due to their conveyance to a central
point and relatively long processing times. In 1995
mould-cure retreading accounted for 47 % of all
retreading operations in western Europe (5), but it is
gradually losing ground to precure retreading.
(17) From the point of view of the product’s characteristics
and the use to which it is put, in spite of the progress
(13) Precure retreading consists in applying a precured tread made by retreaders in the 1980s and 1990s appreciable
obtained from an outside supplier to the tyre casing differences remain between new tyres and retreads. In
using a cold process. This system is used in small the minds of most users and distributors, a tyre whose
workshops run by specialised traders or independent tread has been renewed is associated with reduced
retreaders. In 1995 precure retreading accounted for reliability, a factor that must be taken into account.
53 % of all retreading operations in western Europe. Many hauliers refuse to use such tyres on a tractor unit’s
steering axle and/or avoid using them for long-distance
transport or the carriage of highly perishable goods.
Some manufacturers, including Michelin, and most
dealers still recommend, even nowadays, that some of
(14) Owing to the characteristics of the techniques employed these precautions be observed. This is one of the reasons
the two systems described above are generally aimed at why retreaded tyres are markedly cheaper than new
different bodies of customers. Mould-cure retreading is tyres.
aimed mainly at a body of customers made up of
specialised dealers or wholesalers (who act as intermedi-
ary vis-à-vis the final consumer), whereas precure
retreading is aimed mainly at a body of customers
consisting principally and directly of final consumers.
(18) Despite yielding a comparable mileage if properly used,
(15) Despite the differences between the two retreading a retreaded tyre costs as a rule 50 % less than a new one.
systems, the products obtained are perfectly substitutable Only new tyres sold under ‘third line’ brand names stand
from the consumer’s point of view. A tyre dealer can comparison price-wise, although they are still moretherefore have recourse to either system. It should expensive. These are tyres of lower quality, imported for
be noted, moreover, that, although it requires more the most part from Asia or central and eastern Europe
expensive equipment than the precure system, mould- or sold under private brands (being manufactured for
cure retreading is not the prerogative of the tyre so-called distributor brands). Such tyres, which are
manufacturers and is practised by many medium-sized generally not retreadable, enjoyed a certain amount of
independent businesses. In market studies on retreading growth in the early 1990s when the industry as a whole
was in crisis. They account for only a small proportion
of all new truck and bus tyres sold on the French market
([...] of total sales, according to documents found on
Michelin’s premises, [...] according to other manufac-
turers, [...] between 3 and 6 %).(5) That is, the EEA countries plus Switzerland.
L 143/4 EN 31.5.2002Official Journal of the European Communities
D. THE TYRE MARKET eastern European producers who sell part of their output
in western Europe. The volume of these sales is, however,
not significant when compared with those of the six
majors. Sales by Yokohama or Toyo thus accounted for
(19) The main features of the tyre market will be analysed at most 1 % of the market respectively.
one by one below, and then the peculiarities of the
retread market will be examined in detail. Particular
Table 1: Market shares in Europe, all tyres combinedattention will be paid to the market for replacement
(%)truck tyres in France because it is on that market that
the conduct objected to was identified.
Manufacturer 1993 1995
Michelin 31,9 31,4
(20) By and large the tyre industry is highly concentrated
both globally and at the European level. In 1997 six Continental 13,9 17,1groups (Michelin, Bridgestone, Goodyear, Continental,
Sumitomo and Pirelli) with a presence in numerous
Goodyear 13,1 13,3countries controlled more than 72 % of world tyre sales
and over 86 % of European sales.
Pirelli 9,2 8,6
Bridgestone 9,3 7,7
(21) At world level, two manufacturers, Michelin (France)
Sumitomo 9,3 7,7and Bridgestone (Japan), which in 1997 each accounted
for between 18 and 20 % of all tyres sold, were
Othersconstantly vying for leadership. Goodyear (United States)
followed closely with 15 % of the market. Then, some 13,3 13,5
Yokohama, Toyo,way behind, came Continental (Germany), Sumitomo/
Vredestein + 16 othersDunlop (Japan) and Pirelli (Italy) with 8 %, 6 % and 5 %
of the market respectively.
TOTAL 100,0 100,0
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (6).
(22) The position changed in 1999 when Goodyear and
Sumitomo merged, propelling the new entity to the
head of the field with a combined market share in excess
Table 2: Central and eastern European producersof 21 %.
‘Tyre’ turnover
Producer in 1993
(23) The market shares are not spread evenly across the (million ECU)
world, each of the three main players, Michelin, Bridge-
stone and Goodyear, having a preponderant presence in Matador (Slovakia) 110
its ‘domestic’ market.
Sava (Slovenia) 110
Barum (Czech Republic) 105
(24) Thus, in western Europe, the six world leaders rank in a
slightly different order. Table 1 shows that the level of
Stomil (Poland) 94concentration in the European market is even higher
than at world level and that the Michelin group is the
TC-Debica (Poland) 90clear European leader with a market share much bigger
than those of Continental and Goodyear, which were in
Victoria (Romania) 59second and third places until the Goodyear/Sumitomo
alliance was announced. The latter operation resulted in
Taurus (Hungary) 50the new entity ranking second, still well behind Michelin,
though, its combined market share still being 10 percen-
Source: ‘L’industrie du caoutchouc dans l’Union européenne’, BLIC,tage points lower than Michelin’s.
October 1995.
(25) Apart from a few small western European producers (e.g.
Vredestein (Netherlands), Nokian (Finland), Trelleborg
(Sweden), Marangoni (Italy)), the other competitors (6) Study entitled ‘The World Tyre Industry, a new perspective to
2005’, the EIU, 1997.include a number of south-east Asian and central and
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(26) The structure of supply in the Community is not in Europe should be stressed. In 1995 specialised
distributors accounted for 70 % of sales of replacementhomogeneous but varies considerably from one Member
State to another. The Michelin group’s market shares tyres for motor vehicles. Car dealers and garages came
next with 18,9 % of sales, followed by supermarkets withvary widely in Europe, [...] in Spain, Italy and the
Netherlands, [...] in France and Finland, to around [...] in 7,1 % and service stations with 4 %. This domination by
specialised distributors is even more marked in the caseGermany and the United Kingdom, for example. In
France, where the manufacturer has always enjoyed a of truck tyres. Sales to road hauliers are dominated
overwhelmingly by the specialist trade, which is able toparticularly high reputation, Michelin’s position in terms
of market share ([...] all types combined) is especially provide them with personalised service and advice. The
choice, fitting and management of truck tyres involvestrong, much more so in fact than in the rest of the
Community. numerous technical considerations.
(31) Increasingly, manufacturers are becoming directly con-
(27) Across Europe there are some 120 tyre-manufacturing cerned in the distribution of tyres, notably through
plants. Michelin, which owns 30, has more than twice integrated networks and franchises. These distribution
as many as its nearest competitor. In France, five channels have greater brand-promoting potential than
companies own production plants. Out of a total of independent dealers. The fear that distribution will be
19 plants Michelin controls 11, which in terms of French controlled more and more by competitors is having a
production capacity represents more than 50 % of the knock-on effect by inducing manufacturers to go further
total. Pneumatiques Kléber, which is controlled by down this road.
Michelin, has another two. The remaining plants are
owned as follows: Bridgestone/Firestone and Goodyear
each have one plant, while Continental and Dunlop
(Sumitomo) each have two. Of these 19 plants, only five
produce truck tyres, four of them being Michelin-owned (32) While replacement tyre distribution is generally speaking
and the fifth being owned by Dunlop. highly fragmented, there are major differences between
the markets for car tyres and truck tyres. ‘Car’ distri-
bution is highly diversified and is effected mainly via
auto service centres (31 %), car manufacturers’ networks
(26 %) and tyre specialists.
(28) This horizontal concentration is accompanied by strong
vertical integration. The tyre manufacturers are con-
trolling the distribution channels more and more. This
trend, which began in the United Kingdom back in the
(33) In the case of truck tyres, on the other hand, specialised1970s, spread to France in the early 1990s.
dealers, be they independent or part of a network,
distribute between 75 % and 85 % of tyres on the
new replacement tyre market, auto service centres and
supermarkets in particular being almost entirely absent
from this market. The remaining 15 to 25 % are
delivered either direct under public supply contracts, to(29) Over the last ten years or so cheap, low-quality new
the owners of large fleets or through direct purchases bytyres known as ‘third-line’ brands have started to come
truck garages and dealers. Some supplies take the formon to the market. These tyres have nevertheless enjoyed
of tyre maintenance or total tyre management serviceonly limited growth and account for fewer than 10 % of
(‘mileage’) contracts between manufacturers and inde-new replacement tyres. Originally, third-line tyres were
pendent hauliers. Michelin, in an internal documentmade only by south-east Asian and central and eastern
dating from 1996, states that tyre specialists account forEuropean companies. In recent years, however, the
[...] of replacement sales, the remainder being distributedleading tyre manufacturers have also moved into this
via direct sales to users [...], truck dealers [...] andsegment, often by buying up some of companies
maintenance contracts [...].concerned. This is the case with Michelin (Taurus
and Stomil), and also with Continental (Barum) and
Goodyear (Debica). The aim is to satisfy demand from
customers for whom price is a decisive factor when
buying tyres.
(34) According to the Commission’s best estimates, French
specialised dealers control some 2 225 sales outlets,
approximately 500 of which belong to integrated net-
works controlled by tyre manufacturers. Michelin owns
by far the largest network. The French manufacturer has
created a European network called ‘Euromaster’, whose(30) From the demand point of view, the importance of the
part played by specialised dealers in tyre distribution holding company is located in the Netherlands and
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which has more than 1 200 outlets in eight countries. rainbow sign, controls [...] of the truck tyre market;
the buying association ‘Seda-Point S’, which, with [...]Although the network is controlled by Michelin, it is not
exactly an in-house sales medium as Euromaster markets members reportedly controls [...] of the market; and
PAP, whose [...] members are said to control about [...].competing brands as well as Michelin products. The
network has about 330 sales outlets in France, more The last-mentioned entity is not really a group, but
rather a ‘trade association’. None of these groupings hasthan 240 of which distribute truck tyres. For its part,
Sumitomo/Dunlop controls 120 sales outlets directly so far been recognised as such by Michelin, with the
result that their members cannot benefit, vis-à-vis the(via ‘Vulco’, formerly ‘Pneu Holding’), while Bridgestone/
Firestone has 26 (under the ‘Gay’, ‘Métifiot’ and ‘Maxi- market leader, from the more favourable joint purchas-
ing terms that are available. A number of regionalpneu’ names). In terms of market share, the importance
of the manufacturers’ networks is even greater in that groups are also developing such as DK ([...] sales outlets),
Ayme ([...]) and Vaysse ([...]).they control more than 30 % of the market for new
replacement truck tyres. The market shares can be
broken down as follows: [...] for Euromaster, [...] for
Vulco and [...] for Bridgestone/Firestone.
(37) The breakdown of the various forms of tyre distribution
(all types combined) on the French market was as follows
in 1996: integrated networks (manufacturers): 25,52 %;
independent networks: 17 %; (independent) buying
associations: 34 %; other independents: 23,48 %.
Approximately 75 % of all tyre distribution in France is(35) Manufacturers, including Michelin, have tried in recent
therefore still, formally at least, carried on independentlyyears to maintain the closest possible contact with those
of the manufacturers.distributors who have remained independent. To this
end networks or ‘clubs’ have developed, formed by
independent dealers to whom a manufacturer grants
certain specific advantages in return for numerous
commitments consisting for the most part in promoting
the manufacturer’s brands. These networks are some-
(38) The structure of demand varies, however, considerablytimes called ‘soft franchises’. In France, the most out- from one Member State to another. While in somestanding example is the network formed by the signa- countries (United Kingdom, Germany) tyre distributiontories to the ‘Convention bilatérale de coopération is highly concentrated, it is more fragmented elsewhereprofessionnelle et d’assistance technique’ (bilateral busi- (Italy, Spain, Portugal). In fact, although independentness cooperation and service assistance agreement), specialised dealers predominate in those countries wherebetter known as the ‘Club des amis Michelin’ (Michelin chains (integrated networks, ‘fast-fit’ oil change centres)Friends Club), which has 163 members and 375 sales have hitherto been thin on the ground owing, amongoutlets and which, according to Michelin, accounts [...] other things, to the market being considered too small,of the market for new replacement truck tyres and [...] quick-service integrated chains are currently experienc-of the retreaded tyres market. The other clubs or ing strong growth. In point of fact, although the marketnetworks belonging to manufacturers, which are of shares of specialised dealers and chains look set to growmuch lesser importance, are the ‘Réseau BF Partner’, further after 2000, this growth should benefit mainlywhich reportedly has between [...] and [...] members, the integrated chains, the independent specialised retailer‘Vulcopneu +’, with approximately [...] members, ‘Sem- being threatened in the long term with gradual exclusionpérit’ ([...] members) and the recently set -up ‘Réseau from the market.Pneu expert’, introduced into France in 1997 by Conti-
nental.
The truck tyre market in figures
(36) To counter this entry en masse by manufacturers into
the distribution market, a number of independent dealers
have tried to join forces. They have yet to manage,
however, to get their act together sufficiently to set (39) Generally speaking, with regard to the Community an
analysis of the various statistical sources shows thatup truly standardised chains capable of competing
successfully with the manufacturers’ networks or their aggregate sales of truck tyres, all types combined (includ-
ing retreads) come to around 15,5 million units. Thevarious ‘clubs’. The investigation carried out by the
Commission in 1997 revealed that the major groupings table below, which was found on Michelin’s premises
and which concerns 1995, is fairly representative andof independents are as follows: ‘Arc en Ciel’, which, with
[...] sales outlets in France grouped together under a gives a good overview:
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Table 3: Table 4: Number of truck tyres sold in France between
1988 and 1996 (10)Truck tyre market in the Community (7)
Original NewNew Year RetreadedCountry Retreaded equipment replacement(OE+RT) (8)
1988 437 325 1 139 065 1 085 080Denmark [...] [...]
1989 456 862 1 195 076 1 135 311Finland [...] [...]
1990 367 238 1 192 229 1 075 392Sweden [...] [...]
1991 358 507 1 123 982 1 035 331
Germany [...] [...]
1992 295 555 1 095 589 1 036 158
United Kingdom [...] [...]
1993 243 117 1 043 130 945 582
Austria [...] [...]
1994 314 474 1 147 306 967 740
Belgium [...] [...]
1995 (11) 362 522 1 242 910 960 100
Netherlands [...] [...]
1996 372 807 1 068 495 911 217
France (9) [...] [...]
Average 356 490 1 138 642 1 016 879
Spain [...] [...]
Italy [...] [...]
Greece [...] [...]
(42) Over the period in question, the total market for truck
tyres amounted on average to 2,5 million tyres, 14,2 %
Portugal [...] [...] of which were original equipment tyres, 45,3 % new
replacement tyres and 40,5 % retreaded tyres.
TOTAL [...] [...]
(43) On the replacement market, which totals on average
2,15 million tyres, sales break down into 1,14 million
new tyres and just over a million retreaded tyres. The
share of retreaded tyres may therefore be put at 47,2 %
on average.
(40) Of these 15,5 million units, original equipment tyres
account for about 14 % of the total, or 2,25 million. The
overall volume of the European replacement tyre market
is therefore approximately 13,3 million. Of these sales,
the retread market accounts for approximately 48 %.
Specific characteristics of the retreaded tyre market
(44) According to Michelin’s estimates, nearly [...] truck tyre
casings were retreaded in western Europe in 1995. The
(41) Given the features of the French replacement truck tyre precure retread segment is growing overall while the
market, some figures may be given to illustrate trends. mould-cure segment is shrinking. Thus in France in
1992 the mould-cure share came to 82 % compared
with only 75 % or so today.
(7) Source: Michelin, taken from the document ‘Rapport sur le (10) Tyres study, ‘Journal de l’Automobile’ No 544 of 20.9.1996.
(11) The truck tyre sales figures do not match those given in the tablerechapage transmis à M. Vasdeboncœur’.
(8) Original equipment (OE) — replacement (RT). provided by Michelin in paragraph 39 or in the Eurostat table in
paragraph 150. The differences are due to the different sources(9) The sales figures for France are not identical to figures to be found
in other tables in this Decision provided by third parties. The relied upon and the different calculation methods used. This
Decision relies first and foremost on the Michelin data.Commission relies first and foremost on the Michelin data.
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(45) At Community level the structure of supply also varies opinion, he used competently during the first phase of
their life. He regards casings which are in good conditionconsiderably from one Member State to another. The
two main players on the market are Bandag and as continuing to belong to him and will generally not
entrust them to a retreading firm unless specific note isMichelin, which operate in most countries albeit in
different ways. Michelin uses mainly the mould-cure taken of the matrix number stamped on the sidewall of
the tyre. This enables him to check whether it is his ownsystem and has several large retreading plants in Europe,
including two in France (Clermont-Ferrand and Avalon). tyres that he receives back in retread form and not other
tyres with possible unknown defects.Bandag on the other hand has set up a network of
franchisees who do precure retreading. With approxi-
mately 1 500 000 casings retreaded each year, it is
estimated that Michelin holds nearly [...] of the European
market, while Bandag’s franchise network controls
approximately [...].
(49) Accordingly demand for retreaded tyres or for the
retreading service emanates in the final analysis from
hauliers. Having said that, specialised dealer-distributors
of truck tyres are in most cases charged with acting as
intermediaries between the retreader and the haulier.
(46) However, the market shares of the two competitors
vary appreciably from country to country. In France
especially, where Michelin and its subsidiary Pneu Lau-
rent, which specialises in retreading, are firmly entren-
ched, the joint market shares of these two firms regularly
E. MICHELIN’S COMMERCIAL POLICYexceeds [...]. Bandag’s franchise network, which ranks
second on the market, holds only [...].
(50) It is necessary to highlight the various aspects of the
commercial policy pursued by Michelin in France from
1980 until 1998 inclusive since after 31 December
(47) A user can procure retreaded truck tyres in a number of 1998 the commitments submitted by Michelin to the
ways. Either he supplies his own casing to a tyre Commission put an end to the abusive nature of that
specialist, a franchisee or an industrial retreader and policy. The analysis will focus on each of the three
recovers it once it has been retreaded (‘custom’ aspects of which the policy consisted, namely:
retreading), or he provides a casing and at the same
time buys a retreaded tyre made from another casing
(‘standard exchange’ retreading), or else he buys a
retreaded tyre outright without providing any casing at 1. the general price conditions for France for pro-
all. In France, unlike in other Member States, custom fessional dealers (‘Conditions Générales de Prix
retreading is by far the most common practice (accord- France aux Revendeurs Professionnels’), which are
ing to manufacturers’ estimates it accounts for between the backbone of Michelin’s commercial policy. (For
75 % and 90 % of all retreading operations). convenience, this category will include individual
commercial cooperation agreements (‘conventions
de coopération commerciale’), which are simply an
extension of the general conditions);
(48) For this reason the business of retreading is generally
2. the agreement for optimum use of Michelin truckconsidered in France to be not a sales activity but a
tyres (‘Convention pour le Rendement Optimumservice, or after-sales service, activity. Most hauliers
des Pneumatiques Poids Lourd Michelin’ — ‘PROcalculate the cost of a truck tyre on the basis of the
agreement’), which may be subscribed to underpurchase price, the mileage obtained and the residual
certain conditions by truck tyre dealers wishing tovalue of the casing should it be resold. In calculating the
obtain rebates or other benefits;cost of a truck or bus tyre, several phases in its life are
usually taken into account, i.e. an initial phase as a new
tyre, followed by a second and sometimes a third
phase as a ‘reconditioned’ tyre. Since the price of a
reconditioned tyre is much lower than that of a new 3. the agreement on business cooperation and assist-
ance service (‘Convention de Coopération Pro-tyre, retreading reduces the total cost per kilometre of
the tyre over its whole life. One practical consequence fessionnelle et d’Assistance service’ known as the
‘Club des amis Michelin’, or Michelin Friends Club),of this is that each haulier wishes to be sure that the
casings used in the retreads he receives back are those of reserved for a limited number of dealers wishing to
cooperate more closely with Michelin.the tyres which he bought new and which, in his
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1. THE GENERAL PRICE CONDITIONS FOR FRANCE FOR The various rebates
PROFESSIONAL DEALERS
(56) The rebates provided for in the general conditions were
divided into three categories, namely quantity rebates,
(51) The general price conditions for France for professional rebates for the quality of the dealer’s service to users
dealers laid down, for professional dealers, among other (‘service bonus’) and rebates dependent on increases in
things the conditions of sale and the prices for a large new tyre sales (‘progress bonus’). In addition, dealers
part of Michelin tyres intended for the replacement exceeding for two financial years in a row a given
market, and in particular car, van, forklift, truck, earth- Michelin turnover threshold were allowed to negotiate
mover, agricultural and light plant tyres, and retreads. a ‘commercial cooperation agreement’ (known as an
‘individual agreement’) entitling them to further rebates.
(52) The conditions provided for a pricing system which
comprised, firstly, a ‘list’ price known as the ‘invoicing Quantity rebates
scale’ (net price invoiced, less any rebates) and, secondly,
a highly complex set of rebates which, until 1997, were
in most cases not paid until the last day of February of
(57) The size of the quantity rebates depended on thethe year following the financial year concerned.
turnover achieved by the dealer with Michelin products
during the accounting year, all tyre types combined
apart from heavy plant tyres and retreads. The conditions
comprised a ‘grid’ showing the percentages deductible
(53) It was not until 1997, after the entry into force of a from the list price for the entire turnover achieved. In
French law of 1 July 1996 prohibiting selling at a loss, 1995 for example, these rebate percentages ranged from
that Michelin decided to overhaul its commercial policy. 7,5 % on a turnover of FRF 9 000 to 13 % on a turnover
From that moment on, the bulk of the rebates and/or of over FRF 22 million.
payments made before the end of February of the year
following the reference period were shown on the
invoice. The system existing until 1996 inclusive and
(58) The ‘heavy plant tyre’ and ‘retreads’ categories each hadthat established as from 1997 will be examined in turn
their own grid. In 1995 for example, the rebates ranged,below.
in the case of retreads, from 2 % on a turnover of
over FRF 7 000 to 6 % on purchases exceeding FRF
3,92 million.
The system of rebates from 1980 to 1996
(59) It was not until 1995 and 1996 that the general
conditions provided, under certain conditions, for three
advances on quantity rebates, payable in May, September
and December of the current financial year and corre-
General sponding, provisionally, to 5 % of the ‘truck + earth-
mover + forklift + light plant’ turnover achieved in
respect of each of the corresponding periods.
(54) Before 1997 Michelin’s general conditions provided for a
complex system of rebates which covered an accounting
Service bonusyear beginning on 1 January and ending on 31 December
and which for the most part were not paid until the last
day of February of the calendar year following the
financial year in question.
(60) The service bonus was an additional incentive proposed
by Michelin to the specialised dealer ‘to improve his
equipment and after-sales service’. In reality the degree
of cooperation and the services offered to Michelin were
(55) The dealer paid for new or retreaded tyres bought from also taken fully into account when the rates were
Michelin at the price quoted in Michelin’s official fixed (12).
‘invoicing scale’. In most cases this amount had to be
paid within ‘30 days of the end of the accounting
month’. On the other hand, the amount of the rebates
obtained was not received until the end of February of
the following year, i.e. up to 13 months after the date of (12) Between the assessments ‘good’ and ‘excellent’, for example, twice
as many points may be awarded in some cases.the relevant transaction.
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(61) To qualify for such a bonus, a minimum annual turnover Michelin also demanded under this heading ‘statistics on
sales broken down by product, knowledge of the localhad to be achieved with Michelin products in the course
of the year. The amount ranged from FRF 160 000 in market’. From 1992 onwards the dealer had to provide
relevant information concerning his statistics, his sales1980 to FRF 205 000 in 1985. It then became
FRF 50 000, falling to FRF 45 000 in 1995 and 1996. forecasts broken down by product (2 points) and
technical data on products such as performance data,
quoting stock numbers (2 points), or unquantifiable
information (1 point). Some of the dealers who were
consulted confirmed that they had been asked to provide
(62) The size of the bonus, which was fixed at the beginning sales statistics showing how Michelin compared with its
of the year by annual agreement with the dealer in a competitors.
document entitled ‘Service bonus’, depended on com-
pliance with commitments entered into by the dealer in
a number of areas. Each commitment corresponded to a
number of points, and the exceeding of certain thresh-
olds of points gave entitlement to a bonus corresponding (66) Retreading: between 1980 and 1987 a dealer earned
to a percentage of the turnover achieved with Michelin points if he had a roadside assistance vehicle for
France, all tyre types combined. This percentage ranged trucks (1 point) and knowledge of how to sort casings
from 0 to 1,5 % between 1980 and 1991 and from 0 to (2 points). Between 1987 and 1992, if he had the
2,25 % between 1992 and 1996. necessary know-how and means of sorting Michelin
casings with a view to their being retreaded or regrooved,
he earned between 0 and 2 points. From 1992 onwards
he earned 1 point if he promoted regrooving and 1 point
if he systematically had Michelin casings retreaded by
(63) Between 1980 and 1995 the commitments to be Michelin. In 1996 only the systematic carrying-out of
complied with by dealers grew appreciably both in the first retreading of Michelin tyres by Michelin was
number (to between 10 and 13 items for which points insisted upon.
could be awarded) and in terms of their content. Most
of the criteria concerned services rendered to customers
or knowledge about products. Thus the criteria enabling
the size of the bonus to be increased included staff
training, possession of certain machinery, vehicles and
know-how, quality of facilities, etc. Some of the criteria, Rebates dependent on increases in new tyre sales (‘progresshowever, benefited mainly Michelin. Three of them may bonus’)be mentioned here.
(67) This category included two bonuses, i.e. the progress(64) New products service: between 1980 and 1987 the com-
bonus and the rate bonus. However, since the latter doesmitment consisted in ‘supplying customers with new
not apply to truck tyres, it will not be discussed here.Michelin products’ and ‘obtaining supplies of new
products, giving the following entitlements depending
on the type and dimension concerned: less than 30 %:
0 points, between 30 and 50 %: 1 point, more than 50 %:
2 points’. Between 1987 and 1990 the commitment
(68) The progress bonus was intended to reward dealers whochanged. It now consisted in obtaining supplies of new
agreed at the beginning of the year to undertake inproducts as a proportion of the regional share laid down
writing to exceed a ‘minimum base, fixed by commonfor those products, giving the following entitlements:
agreement, depending on past performance and futureless than the regional share (0 points), equal to that
prospects’ and who managed to exceed it. The base wasshare (1 point) or higher than that share (2 points). From
proposed each year and was negotiated with the dealer.1990 onwards the commitment took the form of ‘a
positive contribution towards new Michelin products:
knowledge and promotion of the said products: 2 points.
Advertising at the point of sale: 1 point’.
(69) To calculate the bonus Michelin used the following
formula:
(65) Market information: between 1980 and 1987 the commit-
ment consisted in providing Michelin (‘the supplier’), to
help it plan its production, either annually (1 point) or
Cquarterly (2 points) with the largest possible amount of
P (rebate) = T × ---- R-Binformation on the behaviour of the different types of
product, mileage obtained, etc. Between 1987 and 1992 R
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(70) In this formula ‘C’ is the truck tyre turnover, ‘R’ the (b) bonuses were agreed at the beginning of the year
in the light of the dealer’s situation, with the resultactual number of tyres sold in the course of the year and
‘B’ the ‘base’ (commitment to buy in terms of number of that, if the company changed hands during the year
(sale, take-over, merger, etc.), the commitmentstyres). ‘T’ is a rate which increased gradually depending
on dealers’ buying commitments in terms of number of became null and void and the bonuses had to be
renegotiated in the light of the new situation.tyres. The bonuses obtainable and the mechanism for
calculating them have changed substantially in recent Moreover, towards the end of December, a down-
ward indexation of the base could take place. Thisyears.
was decided unilaterally by Michelin and could vary
from one type of product to another. It was also(71) Between 1980 and 1984 the bonus ranged from 2,5 %
used to calculate the reduction factors to be appliedfor a commitment to buy between 30 and 1 499 tyres
in working out the following year’s bases. Into 15 % for a commitment to buy more than 8 500 tyres,
exceptional circumstances, a bonus might be paidwith six separate steps. In 1985 the minimum bonus
even where the base was not reached (e.g. where arate was increased to 5 %, while the number of steps
tyre was in short supply, resulting in supplieswas reduced to five. Between 1986 and 1994 the
drying up, or where the dealer was a member ofminimum rate was increased still further to 7,5 %, the
the Friends Club).number of steps being reduced to four, as follows:
between 30 and 999 tyres: 7,5 % of the amount by
which the base was exceeded; between 1 000 and
2 699 tyres: 10 % of the amount by which the base was
exceeded; between 2 700 and 8 499 tyres: 12,5 % of the
amount by which the base was exceeded; 8 500 or
more: 15 % of the amount by which the base was
The specific conditions granted to signatories toexceeded, such amounts being limited to 25 % of the
‘Commercial Cooperation Agreements’base.
(72) In 1995 and 1996 the mechanism for calculating the
bonus changed substantially. There were now only two
steps, but more importantly, where the amount by
which the base was exceeded was equal to or greater
(75) Dealers who achieved, with Michelin France’s productsthan 20 % of the base, a single bonus rate applied to the
a turnover exceeding the maximum amount referred toentire turnover achieved. Thus:
in Table I provided by Michelin concerning quantity
rebates (e.g. FRF 24 million between 1991 and 1994— between 30 and 999 tyres: 12 % of the amount by
and FRF 22 million between 1995 and 1996) couldwhich the base was exceeded if the progress was
sign a commercial cooperation agreement (commonlylower than 20 % of the base and 2 % of aggregate
known as an ‘individual agreement’) with Michelin. Fromturnover in respect of new truck tyres if the
1993 onwards, if they purchased more than 1 000 truck,progress was equal to or greater than 20 % of the
earthmover and/or light plant tyres, they signed twobase,
individual agreements, namely a ‘car and van’ agreement
— over 1 000 tyres: 15 % of the amount by which the and an ‘industrial products’ agreement. These agreements
base was exceeded if the progress was lower than did not replace the general conditions, but merely
20 % of the base and 2,5 % of aggregate turnover supplemented them. According to Michelin, 16 to
in respect of new truck tyres if the progress was 18 major dealers signed this type of agreement between
equal to or greater than 20 % of the base. 1993 and 1996, 11 to 13 of which were industrial
products agreements.
(73) If a dealer managed only to achieve sales equal to the
‘base’, he nevertheless received a bonus worth 0,5 % of
all tyres bought.
(74) To understand fully how this bonus operated, two of its
(76) The main commitments entered into when signing suchaspects must be brought to the fore:
agreements were: to provide technical information and
after-sales service for Michelin products; to help launch(a) the key feature of the bonus and one of the key
new Michelin products; to submit monthly or quarterlyelements in the discussion about annual commit-
purchasing and sales forecasts to Michelin; and to obtainments was the fixing of the ‘base’, because it was
regular supplies of Michelin products. The benefitsthe amount by which this was exceeded that
received in return were far from negligible:determined the maximum amount of remuneration
payable. It was therefore in the dealer’s interest that
the base should be set at the lowest possible level
so that he might achieve it easily. It was in
Michelin’s interest, on the other hand, that it should — an extension of the tables corresponding to the
quantity rebates (potentially resulting in a differencebe set at the highest possible level so as to maximise
its incentive effect; of up to 2 % of turnover);
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— a specific, favourable system for calculating the each of these categories, for dealers entitled, by virtue of
their volume of purchases (more than 2 500 tyres in theprogress bonus.
truck/earthmover/plant category), to sign an individual
commercial agreement.
(77) A specific scale applied in which the bonus was sand-
wiched between a threshold and a ceiling. Dealers could
(a) General conditionsthus generally obtain a progress bonus of 1 % (threshold)
of annual turnover (truck/earthmover/light plant) simply
by achieving the base, up to a maximum of 3 % if they
exceeded the base by 15 % (ceiling).
(82) In the truck tyre sector, new and retreaded tyres were
treated differently.
(78) By way of example, in 1996 a commitment to purchase
between 1 000 and 8 999 tyres granted entitlement to a
bonus ranging from 1 % (minimum) if the base was (i) A s r e g a r d s n e w t r u c k t y r e s
reached to 2,5 % (maximum) if it was exceeded by 15 %.
A commitment to purchase more than 9 000 tyres made
it possible to earn up to 3 % more in return for exceeding (83) The main changes concerned the disappearance of
the base by 15 %. quantity rebates, the service bonus and the progress
bonus, and the appearance of new categories, namely
‘invoice rebates’, the ‘achieved-target bonus’, ‘end-of-year
rebates’ and a ‘multiproduct rebate’.
(79) From 1993 onwards an additional bonus in support of
industrial products of 1 % of turnover achieved with
new Michelin truck, forklift, earthmover and light plant (84) Invoice rebates: invoice rebates were granted on the basis
tyres could be obtained if the truck base was reached, as of the number of new truck/earthmover/light plant tyres
could: purchased the previous year, the average for the two
previous years or the average for the three previous
years, depending on which was most favourable to the
— additional credit (a further 10, 20 or 30 days dealer, according to the following scale:
worth),
— payment of part of the end-of-year bonus on the
first working day in January of the following year
instead of on the last day of February.
Table 5
Rebates (%)The rebate system in 1997 and 1998
Tyres purchased
1997 1998
(80) As of 1997 Michelin made substantial changes to < 30 15,00 15,00
its business conditions for dealers, eliminating certain
30 to 199 16,00 18,00abusive practices which had hitherto characterised its
200 to 999 16,50 18,50behaviour. Further changes were made in 1998. The
reasons behind these changes, which were in any case 1 000-2 499 17,00 19,00
not introduced until after the Commission had opened
its investigation, lie partly in the amendment of the
French legislation prohibiting selling at a loss, and partly
(85) Dealers wishing to obtain a larger invoice rebate thanin the extensive restructuring of the Michelin group at
that due to them under the above scale had to sign athe end of 1996.
target contract drawn up in agreement with Michelin
which took account of ‘the dealer’s potential together
with forecast market trends’. The invoice rebate obtain-
able then corresponded to the tranche within which the
The new rebate system commitment entered into by the dealer fell.
(86) Such ‘targets’ had to be realistic and not be over- or(81) Different, separate business conditions were laid down
for each of the following five product categories: 1. car/ underestimates. Michelin would therefore propose to
the dealer a choice between his previous year’s perform-van, 2. truck/earthmover, 3. plant/forklift, 4. agricultural
tractor, 5. two-wheeler, with different conditions, within ance and the average of his previous two or three years’
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1998performances, factoring-in ‘forecast market growth’. In
1997 this growth was set at 1 % irrespective of the
region.
Turnover based onInvoice rebate End-of-year rebatethe invoicing scale
(87) Exceptionally, a different choice could be made if the (%) (%)(thousand FRF)dealer’s buying capacity had been adversely affected
(arrival of a competitor in the same area, loss of a good
customer, etc.). Exceptionally also, the current year’s 15,00 0,00
target could be equal to the previous year’s performance.
< 120 3,75
18,00 > 120 and < 250 4,00
> 250 4,25
(88) Dealers whose purchases during the course of a given
year entitled them to a larger rebate than that for which
< 750 4,25they qualified that year benefited from an end-of-year 18,50 > 750 and < 1 200 4,50
correction paid at the end of February of the following > 1 200 4,75
year covering the difference.
< 3 000 4,75
19,00 > 3 000 and < 3 800 5,00
> 3 800 5,25
(89) Lastly, it should be pointed out that in the case of new
dealers the invoice rebate was set at 15 % of turnover
unless they had signed a target contract, in which case
the rebate was fixed by reference to the annual target.
(92) ‘Multiproduct rebate’: dealers whose turnover achieved
through tyres, all types combined, accounted for more
than 50 % of their total turnover and who achieved(90) Achieved-target bonus: dealers who had signed a target
significant sales in at least two of the following categ-contract obtained in 1997 a bonus of 2 % of their net
ories: car/van, motorcycle/scooter, truck and agriculturalannual invoiced turnover, paid at the end of February if
tractor, were entitled to an end-of-year rebate on theirthe target was reached. In 1998 the bonus was set at
invoiced turnover achieved through new products1,5 %.
(excepting heavy plant) and retreaded products accord-
ing to a scale ranging from 1 % to 2,20 % in 1997 and
from 1,5 % to 2,70 % in 1998.
(91) End-of-year rebate: depending on the invoice rebate
originally granted and the net invoiced turnover, a rebate
was paid at the end of February according to the
following scale:
(ii) A s r e g a r d s r e t r e a d e d t r u c k t y r e s
(93) The system was simple and comprised two rebates:
Table 6
— a 5 % invoice rebate on all retreaded products,
1997
— an end-of-year quantity rebate depending on total
net turnover achieved through retreads (van, truck,
Invoice rebate Net invoiced turnover End-of-year rebate earthmover, agricultural tractor, light and heavy
plant), increasing progressively from 1 % (above(%) (thousand FRF) (%) FRF 6 500) to 4 % (above FRF 2 500 000) of total
net turnover achieved through retreads, according
15 0,0 to a 16-step grid ranging from 1 % at the bottom
of the scale to 0,1 % at the top. This rebate was
< 150 1,0 abolished in 1998.
16 > 150 and < 300 1,5
> 300 2,0
< 600 1,5
16,5 > 600 and < 1 200 2,0 (b) Commercial agreements
> 1 200 2,5
< 2 500 2,0 (94) Dealers who had signed an individual agreement ben-
17 > 2 500 and < 3 500 2,5 efited from similar conditions and from an extension of> 3 500 3,0
the scales depending on the quantities purchased.
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(95) For new truck tyres, invoice rebates and end-of-year from Michelin France, the agreement for optimum use
rebates were accordingly increased to: of Michelin truck tyres, which was introduced in 1993,
enabled dealers to obtain further rebates. To this end a
dealer had to enter into a number of obligations:Table 7
Invoice rebates
— sign with Michelin a truck progress bonus commit-
Rebate (%) ment for the current year,
Quantity
1997 1998
— present to Michelin for custom retreading and
standard exchange retreading Michelin truck tyres2 500-9 999 17,50 19,50
which have reached the legal tread wear limit.
> 10 000 18,00 20,00
1997 end-of-year rebates
(98) In return, for every truck casing considered retreadable
by Michelin, the dealer received FRF 45, 65 or 120
Invoice rebate Net turnover End-of-year rebate depending on the type of tyre concerned. If the casings
had been regrooved and then reused, the dealer received(%) (thousand FRF) (%)
an additional FRF 15, 25 or 40. A dealer could therefore
earn a maximum rebate of FRF 160, which in percentage
terms was considerable (15 % according to Bandag;
< 9 000 2,50 Michelin puts it at between [...] and [...], i.e. at a level
17,50 > 9 000 and < 18 000 3,00 similar to that of the service bonus and the progress> 18 000 3,50
bonus taken together in the light of the price invoiced
to the dealer by Michelin for a retreaded tyre). Finally,18,00 < 40 000 4,00
the importance of this bonus is highlighted by the fact> 40 000 4,50
that it accounted, in 1994, [...] of all truck tyre rebates
(source: Michelin).
1998 end-of-year rebates
Turnover based onInvoice rebate End-of-year rebate (99) It is the presence of certain supplementary conditionsthe invoicing scale
that sets the agreement apart with respect to its scope:
(%) (%)(thousand FRF)
< 7 500 5,25 — the maximum bonus that could be earned depend-19,50 > 7 500 and < 10 000 5,50
ed on how well the dealer performed in terms of> 10 000 5,75
new Michelin tyres, i.e. the number of truck tyres
bought from Michelin in the course of the previous20,00 < 48 000 5,75
year. Thus, the maximum number of PRO bonuses> 48 000 6,00
was limited by the number of new truck tyres
bought the previous year. In 1997, however, the
amount of the bonuses granted was no longer
limited by the number of tyres bought the previous
(96) As regards retreaded tyres, the invoice rebate was year, but by the number of tyres which the dealer
increased to 6 % and the end-of-year rebate was had undertaken to buy in the course of the current
increased, in 1997, to 6 %. In addition, in 1998, dealers year in his 1997 target contract,
who had signed an agreement were entitled to an end-
of-year rebate of 1 % (based on the invoicing scale) if
they sold between 2 500 and 10 000 retreaded tyres
— the bonus was calculated by sales outlet (by dealerand of 1,5 % if they sold more than 10 000.
as from 1997), a correction being made at the end
of the year,
2. THE PRO AGREEMENT (AGREEMENT FOR OPTIMUM
USE OF MICHELIN TRUCK TYRES)
— the bonus was paid in the form of a credit towards
the dealer’s purchases of Michelin truck tyres, being
deducted from the following month’s bill.(97) Intended only for dealers purchasing new truck tyres
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(100) In 1998 the PRO agreement was abolished and replaced conditional on attainment of a specific target, which is
agreed with the customer at the beginning of the year.by a clause in the general conditions entitled ‘Retreading
quality service’. On this basis a dealer could earn bonuses One dealer asserts that the target was fixed in terms of
purchasing commitments. The sums involved are veryfor every casing sent to Michelin for retreading, without
any commitments or ceilings. substantial. In 1993, for example, they accounted for
0,9 % of the total turnover of dealers belonging to the
club, that is to say 2,8 % of their gross profit margin
and/or 24,9 % of their current result before tax, i.e. a
quarter of the profits of dealers belonging to the club.3. THE BILATERAL BUSINESS COOPERATION AND SER-
VICE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT (THE MICHELIN
FRIENDS CLUB)
(105) Michelin also grants other benefits which are harder to
quantify but whose importance is far from negligible:
(101) In return for signing a bilateral business cooperation and
service assistance agreement and entering into numerous
— transfer of know-how in many areas,commitments, some dealers can obtain additional finan-
cial benefits from Michelin. The body of signatories form
what is known in the trade as the Michelin Friends Club. — priority access to training courses (in fact 50 % of
courses at Michelin’s training centre are provided
for club members),
(102) The club, which was created in 1990, grouped together
more than 295 sales outlets as early as the end of — offering of contracts concerning new business
1991. In April 1997 more than 163 tyre specialists activities as a matter of priority to specialists
representing 375 sales outlets and upwards of 20 % of (subcontracting of fleet tyre business, breakdown
the new and retreaded truck tyre market were parties to chain, for example),
the agreement. The importance of the agreement to
Michelin France is due to the fact that the club members
— transmission of data on market trends,distribute in France, by themselves, as many tyres as
the integrated networks taken as a whole, all brands
combined, and some 30 % of all Michelin truck tyres. — exclusive distribution of BF Goodrich car tyres.
(106) The package helps to ensure that dealers are moreFeatures of the Club
comfortably off (club members had an average profita-
bility in 1995 of 3,9 %, which was higher than the
average profitability of specialised dealers).
Rationale
Members’ Commitments
(103) Three factors make up the club’s backbone: 1. state of
mind/professionalism, 2. mutual trust between Michelin
and the club and 3. Michelin volumes and ‘temperature’.
(107) The quid pro quos demanded by Michelin in return forMichelin is prepared to lend its support, including its
admission to the club are considerable. In particular,financial support, to club members to help them become
Michelin has the right to oversee the specialist’s businessbetter-performing and more professional, but in return
and to ask him:members must ‘play the game’ and cooperate with
Michelin, which involves among other things guarantee-
ing the manufacturer a certain level in terms of Michelin 1. to communicate to it, each year, balance sheets and
volumes and ‘temperature’ (market share). profit and loss accounts (with a breakdown of
income and expenditure) and statistics on turnover
and services provided. Forward estimates and
spending and financing plans must also be trans-
Michelin’s Contribution mitted if necessary. The dealer must also let Miche-
lin know the identity of all direct or indirect
shareholders in the company and keep it informed
of any event likely to affect control by the company
owning the business premises and/or its strategic
plans. On the basis of this information Michelin(104) Michelin participates in the dealer’s financial effort
notably by contributing towards investment and training carries out individual financial analyses of club
members and holds meetings with them, proposingand by making a financial contribution amounting to
0,75 % of annual Michelin Service turnover. This solutions to any problems encountered. This
enables Michelin to produce statistics and tablescontribution, linked as it is to service turnover, is
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incorporating the consolidated balance sheets of 7. to have the first retreading of truck, earthmover
and van casings carried out by Michelin France.club members;
This obligation was contained in an initial version
dating from 1991. In a subsequent version dating
from 1993 it was removed in respect of vans.
2. to permit Michelin to carry out an analysis of According to Michelin, failure to carry out this
his sales outlet(s) in a number of areas: staff commitment was never and would never have been
qualifications and competence; quality of service penalised. The clause was abolished with effect
and sales promotion; and sales facilities. This from October 1995.
analysis will make it possible to work out an annual
progress commitment in one or more of these Mention should be made, however, of the case of
areas and any steps proposed and agreed jointly. one dealer who wished to deal actively with
On the carrying-out of this commitment will competing retreaders and who complained of
depend the annual payment of a bonus proportion- having been threatened with exclusion from the
ate to the turnover in respect of services; club;
8. to play an active part in programmes aimed at
3. to promote the Michelin brand and its new prod- enhancing sales outlets, increasing truck tyre sales
ucts; display in his sales outlet(s) the advertising and improving knowledge of farming issues and in
material provided (including neon signs and/or vocational training schemes and, where appropri-
a pole with a flag) and the standard product ate, play a part in the truck breakdown chain and
information; and take part in advertising cam- other services rendered to hauliers to the best of
paigns; his abilities.
4. ‘not to divert customer demand away from Miche- (108) In the event of the specialist failing to fulfil his commit-
lin products; Michelin reserves the right to monitor ments, Michelin may cancel the agreement without
compliance with this clause’. This commitment compensation. In that event, the specialist must return
appeared word for word in the original agreements to Michelin any manuals, documents and copies entrust-
and was not formally abolished until 1996. In fact, ed to him under the agreement. In an initial version of
this clause is the very core of the agreement and the agreement dating from early 1990 the dealer was
amounts to an unwritten undertaking to remain also required to pay back to Michelin, over five years
faithful to Michelin products in ‘temperature’ terms and in equal instalments, all sums received by way of
as far as both the car tyre and the truck tyre range financial assistance. From 1992 onwards this obligation
are concerned. becomes more ambiguous, the dealer losing only ‘any
entitlement to the consideration provided for in
Articles 1 to 7’.
Michelin makes access to the club conditional on
compliance by the dealer with a certain Michelin
‘temperature’: in an internal document concerning
the club (13) it is stated in connection with the
II. LEGAL ASSESSMENTcustomer’s partnership or market share that: [...]
Michelin clearly uses this condition as a lever in its
business negotiations, as can be seen from numer-
ous documents found in the course of the investi-
gation;
A. RELEVANT MARKETS
5. to carry a sufficient stock of Michelin products to
meet any customer demand immediately; 1. PRODUCT MARKETS
6. to communicate to Michelin his sales statistics and (109) Producers and dealers, when consulted by way of
forecasts, tyre type by tyre type and for all brands, requests for information from the Commission, were
together with trends in Michelin market shares; unanimous in confirming that the market in tyres for
trucks and buses is quite distinct from the market in
tyres for other types of vehicle. They also confirmed the
differences between the original equipment market and
the replacement market. These aspects will thus not be
analysed in detail (see above paragraphs 3 to 48).(13) Document [...].
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(110) However, the question arises as to whether the market results not only from their different features, but also,
since custom retreading is the most widespread practice,in new replacement tyres for trucks forms a relevant
market in itself (thus excluding retreaded tyres) or from the from the fact that the value of the carcass is
not included in the invoice for the service, a fact whichwhether retreads should be included with new tyres in a
single relevant market in replacement tyres. In the highlights the very different ways in which the two
markets operate, as will be shown below.latter case, there would be a significant competitive
relationship between the two types of tyre.
(114) Second, the respective structures of supply and demand
for the two products are far from identical. On the(111) In its Decision 81/969/EEC (Case IV/29.491 Nederland-
supply side, producers of new tyres are generally quitesche Banden-Industrie Michelin, hereinafter ‘NBIM distinct from retreaders, Michelin being the only com-decision’) (14), the Commission defined the relevant
pany to have a strong position on both market segments.market as the market in new replacement tyres for
On the demand side, the customers of new tyre manufac-trucks and buses. The Court subsequently confirmed the turers are mainly specialised dealers, while the customersCommission’s conclusion that the new tyre market was
of retreaders are mainly transport firms, which usenot subject to competition from retreads to an extent
specialised dealers merely as intermediaries. In the vastsufficient significantly to alter competitive conditions majority of cases, retreading prolongs the use of a newand Michelin’s dominant position on the market. This
tyre by its original owner. The retreader thus acts as aanalysis is still valid, as confirmed by Michelin during
skilled service provider, who does not necessarily havethe investigation (in reply to requests for information
any link with the tyre sales sector. The involvement of afrom the Commission).
dealer is usual, but not essential.
(112) Since the NBIM decision was confined to the new tyre (115) Third, and most importantly, the retread market consti-
market, neither the Commission nor the Court of Justice tutes a secondary ‘after-sales’ service market in relation
had the opportunity to deliver an opinion on the to the market for new tyres. New tyres do not therefore
relevance or otherwise of the retread market, which is constitute a valid substitute for retreads. Since retreading
necessary in this case. Following identical arguments to is performed precisely in order to prolong the life of a
those put forward in support of the definition of the tyre so as to postpone the purchase of a new one, there
relevant market as the market for new tyres, it is clear cannot be real competition between retreading and the
that the retread market is likewise not subject to purchase of a new tyre. The fact that in France more
competition from new tyres to an extent likely to alter than 80 % of transport firms have recourse only to
the competitive conditions prevalent on it. The markets custom retreading, rather than purchasing a retreaded
in new tyres and retreads thus constitute two distinct tyre which they had not previously owned, shows the
relevant markets. The main reasons for this conclusion extent to which the retread market is complementary to
are: and thus distinct from the new tyre market. This is all
the more true given that one of the main features of the
truck tyre market is that, unlike purchasers in the
passenger car category, transport firms systematically
take account of the cost price per kilometre. Retreading
is part of a strategy for reducing the cost price of the
tyre, which in practice rules out the possibility of
effective competition between retreading and the pur-(113) First, there is a marked difference in the price of
chase of a new tyre at the same stage in the life of thenew and retreaded tyres, which reflects the significant
casing.differences between the two products. The vast majority
of new tyres are marketed at a price well above that of
retreads, the average unit price of which is equivalent to
around 50 % of the price of a new casing. This difference
(116) Lastly, analysis of their specific characteristics and their
uses by final consumers shows that new tyres and
retreads are not really substitutable. Hauliers systemati-
cally avoid fitting retreaded tyres to the front of their
tractor units (steer tyres) or to trucks carrying dangerous(14) OJ L 353, 9.12.1981, p. 33.
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goods. These practices arise less from strict security market. Its assessment took account of the limited extent
of parallel imports, the organisation of sales subsidiariesconsiderations (while most specialised dealers recognise
that retreads are less reliable, they agree that high-quality along national lines and the fact that Michelin took
account only of national purchases in calculating itsretreading reduces the risk virtually to zero) than from
the desire, given the spread of just-in-time approaches, rebates. This analysis was deemed to be correct by
the Court of Justice in its judgment in Case 322/81to avoid any incident on the journey that might delay
delivery. The situation that prevailed in 1981 has thus Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v Commission
(hereinafter ‘NBIM judgment’) (15), in paragraph 26: ‘Innot changed significantly.
practice dealers established in the Netherlands obtain
their supplies only from suppliers operating in the
Netherlands. The Commission was therefore right to
take the view that the competition facing Michelin NV is
mainly on the Netherlands market and that it is at that
(117) Likewise, retreaders and dealers in retreaded tyres do not level that the objective conditions of competition are
consider retreads to form a real alternative to new tyres, alike for traders’.
but see them as complementary in that, first to carry out
their business activity, they depend on a regular supply
of new tyres that cannot, or at least can only inad-
equately, be replaced by a supply of retreads, and that
second, retreads are a secondary product compared with
original equipment tyres or used replacement tyres,
which constitute essential ‘raw material’ for retreading. (121) Michelin now asserts that the market has become
international. In support of this argument, it cites the
fact that ‘the structure of competition on the replacement
tyre market is worldwide: the main players (…) compete
on a world scale’. Michelin also stresses that the group
was reorganised in 1996 into European product lines
(118) This leads to the conclusion that the markets in new (TOUs (16), that standard European legislation now exists
replacement truck tyres and truck retreads are quite and that ‘the international nature of the tyre market
distinct. In this Decision, it will thus be examined has been confirmed in recent years by the large-scale
whether Michelin has a dominant position on both these importation of tyres from Asia and eastern Europe’.
reference markets.
(122) The unquestionable intensification of trade over the
2. GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS last decade certainly made a re-examination of the
geographic dimension of competition on the relevant
product market necessary. Following this re-examin-
ation, the Commission considers that, despite the argu-
ments put forward by Michelin, competition conditions
are not homogeneous at European level and that con-
(119) The relevant geographic market comprises the area in ditions on the French market are appreciably different
which the undertaking concerned is involved in the from those that prevail on the other markets of the
supply and demand of products or services, in which the Community.
conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous
and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas
because the conditions of competition are appreciably
different in those areas.
(123) The argument that the largest international tyre pro-
ducers compete in numerous countries and across the
European Union in no way means that it can be
The market in new replacement tyres
(120) In its NBIM decision, the Commission concluded that (15) [1983] ECR 3461.
(16) Tactical Operational Units.the market in replacement tyres for trucks was a national
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supposed that the relevant geographic market is the (127) The data collected also show that parallel imports are
extremely limited despite the major price differentialworld market. This situation is perfectly compatible with
the existence of conditions of competition that are between the various national markets within the Com-
munity. One of the largest tyre importers (Vandenban)appreciably different in each of the relevant countries.
This was already the situation in the tyre industry at the also states, in a press article supplied by Michelin, ‘that
98 % of its business is in tyres for passenger cars, trucktime, when the Court of Justice found that the Dutch
new replacement tyre market was a national market. tyres being covered by the manufacturers, with the
remaining 2 % accounted for by a breakdown service for
loyal customers’.
(124) What matters in this case is to assess the real capacity of
dealers to obtain supplies from outside their national
territory and the similarities or differences in the supply (128) There are several reasons for this, which are:structure.
1. Economic:
Purchases from national subsidiaries and limited even if dealers can theoretically obtain supplies
extent of parallel imports from a foreign Michelin subsidiary, they have no
economic interest in doing so since they would pay
the listed price and the purchases would not be
taken into account by Michelin for the calculation
of the rebates;
(125) During its enquiry, by way of requests for information,
the Commission found that in 1997 the large manufac-
turers all organised the distribution and sales of their
2. Historical:tyres along national lines. The situation has thus not
changed since the NBIM decision. Michelin itself
acknowledges that it ‘carries on its business on the
various national replacement markets via commercially in France, wholesaling (a distribution system which
independent companies established in accordance with is conducive to parallel imports) is very under-
the applicable national law. (…) [...]’. All the manufac- developed. It is virtually non-existent on the market
turers also confirm that national dealers obtain supplies for truck tyres. There are marked differences as
almost exclusively from the national trading subsidiaries. regards supply to retailers (‘sell-in’) between the
Michelin itself confirms that although they could obtain countries where, owing to the absence of wholesal-
supplies from sources other than the national subsidiary, ing, the dealers are in direct contact with the
‘dealers, at least as regards their regular supplies, gener- manufacturers (e.g. France, Italy) and the countries
ally use the Michelin company established in their where wholesale distribution is very strong (the
country’. Netherlands, Germany);
3. Technical:
(126) It should be noted that, in its NBIM judgment, the Court
found that the mere fact that dealers obtained supplies
almost systematically from the national subsidiary gave the technical factor is probably the most decisive.
Dealers absolutely require regular and secure supplyrise to the conclusion that the market was national. On
the basis of the observation that ‘the commercial policy across the range. These conditions cannot be
guaranteed by recourse to parallel importers. Thisof the various subsidiaries of the groups competing at
the European or even the world level is generally adapted situation is all the less surprising in that reselling
tyres to hauliers is a very technical business thatto the specific conditions existing on each national
market’, the Court concluded that ‘the Commission was requires the dealer not only to possess technical
knowledge, but also to follow closely a number oftherefore right to take the view that the competition
facing Michelin NV (was) mainly on the Netherlands guidelines issued by the manufacturer, especially
when the tyres, as is generally the case withmarket’. This situation has not changed and is valid for
France today. Michelin tyres, will be regrooved and retreaded. It
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makes sense for dealers to obtain supplies exclus- Country 1993 1994 1995
ively from national subsidiaries of the manufac-
turers, which at the same time provide them France [...] [...] [...]
with documentation and advice on fitting and
monitoring the tyres.
Greece [...] [...] [...]
(129) Furthermore, while it is true that dealers do make import
Italy [...] [...] [...]purchases, they do so sporadically and in very small
quantities: these purchases complement national supply,
but are not in any circumstances substitutable for it.
Norway [...] [...] [...]This point was a touchstone for the definition of the
geographic market in Commission Decision 88/518/
EEC (Case IV/30.178 Napier Brown/British Sugar (17). Netherlands [...] [...] [...]
(130) Thus, the limited extent of parallel imports and the Portugal [...] [...] [...]
large-scale purchasing from the national subsidiaries are
evidence that the geographic market is confined to
United Kingdom [...] [...] [...]French territory within the meaning of the NBIM
judgment.
Sweden [...] [...] [...]
(131) Moreover, differences in the structure of supply in the
various Member States and major price differences are Switzerland [...] [...] [...]
factors that also point to the existence of separate
national markets and in particular of a relevant market
confined to France. Total EU [...] [...] [...]
Total EEA [...] [...] [...]
Differences in the structure of supply Source: Michelin (18).
(132) It should be noted in this connection that the market
shares of each of the large manufacturers vary consider-
ably from country to country. Table 8 below gives
market shares for Michelin:
(133) Such national variations are hardly compatible with
Table 8: Michelin’s shares of the markets in new replace- the theory of a European market characterised byment truck tyres in western Europe (%)
homogeneous competition. While such differences may
depend on how long a firm has been established on the
market and/or on national traditions still affectingCountry 1993 1994 1995
consumer behaviour, the existence of such phenomena,
if confirmed, would support the hypothesis that the
Germany [...] [...] [...] market in replacement tyres for trucks and buses in the
Community is still divided along national lines.
Austria [...] [...] [...]
Belgium [...] [...] [...]
Appreciable price differencesDenmark [...] [...] [...]
Spain [...] [...] [...]
(134) The major differences in tyre prices throughout the
reference period, according to the country where theyFinland [...] [...] [...]
(18) Reply to request for information of 3.12.1996.(17) OJ L 284, 19.10.1988, p. 41.
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are sold, supports the hypothesis that the relevant the price in six Member States of one of the tyres with
the highest sales in one of the most popular dimensionsgeographic market is a national one. Michelin provided
a series of tables that highlight the significant price (Michelin 315/80 R 22.5 XZA), we obtain the following
table:differences within the Community. Thus, if we compare
Table 9
Listed invoice prices, France = 100 (%)
Year (19) France Spain Italy Germany Netherlands United Kingdom
1993 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1994 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1995 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1996 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
(FRF, at the exchange rate on the date in question)
Source: Michelin.
(135) The table shows that in 1993, compared with the French higher [...] and [...]. There is still a [...] difference between
market, listed invoice prices were lower [...] and [...], the countries with the highest and lowest prices for the
but significantly higher [...] and especially [...]. It is tyre, in this case [...].
remarkable that, for the same product, the difference
can be as high as [...], as in the case of [...] and [...].
(136) If we use as a reference the listed prices after deductionAlthough these differences have since narrowed, they
of the invoice rebates, we obtain the following table,are still significant. Compared with the French market,
the listed prices in 1996 were lower [...] and [...]and which shows that significant differences remain:
Table 10
Prices after deduction of the invoice rebates, France = 100 (%)
Year France Spain Italy Germany Netherlands United Kingdom
1993 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1994 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1995 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1996 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
(FRF, at the exchange rate on the date in question)
Source: Michelin.
(137) Lastly, a comparison of the net prices charged by Michelin after deduction of the maximum rebates gives
the following figures:
(19) The data relate to 1 January of each year considered (idem for
the following tables).
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Table 11
Net prices after deduction of the maximum rebates, (20) France = 100 (%)
Year France Spain Italy Germany Netherlands United Kingdom
1993 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1994 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1995 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1996 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
(FRF, at the exchange rate on the date in question)
Source: Michelin.
Michelin thus argues in its reply to the statement of(138) We see that from 1994 in particular the price was objections that ‘more than [...] of the total number ofregularly and significantly higher [...] than in the other new replacement truck tyres sold on the French marketreference countries. For example, in 1994 the price of are not manufactured in France’. However, the flowsthe tyre was some [...] lower [...]. described by Michelin reflect the organisation of pro-
duction on a European scale, which in no way rules out
the existence of national markets. It is the sales con-
ditions which in this case determine the size of the
market, and the flows described by Michelin are flows
between tyre manufacturing plants, including Michelin’s(139) Significant variations are evident, even if these figures
own plants to a large degree, and they are thus outsideshould be treated with caution. It is extremely difficult
the market. Parallel imports, on the other hand, areto draw precise comparisons. Apart from the fact that
much more limited.currency fluctuations can blur interpretation, the price
lists almost never correspond to the price actually
paid and the rebates vary according to the specific
circumstances of each dealer. In this connection, it is
essential to note that the ‘post-invoice’ rebates are
proportionally much higher in France than in countries
such as the Netherlands, Germany or the United
Kingdom. The fact that the above figures take account (142) Secondly, hauliers could very easily purchase their tyres
of the maximum post-invoice rebates, which are largely abroad:
theoretical in the case of France, since few dealers can
benefit from them in full, clearly has the effect of
underestimating French prices in relation to these
countries.
according to Michelin, despite the fact that the manufac-
turer-distributor relationship is on a national scale, final
customers, i.e. haulage fleets, could easily break free
of this compartmentalisation by buying directly from(140) Although these factors are strong indications of the
specialised dealers in the countries with the lowestexistence of a national market in new replacement tyres
prices. This scenario does not correspond to reality.in France, a number of objections were raised by
Given the logistical difficulties of such a strategy and theMichelin.
time pressures on hauliers, it seems unlikely that truck
fleets would themselves obtain supplies abroad,
especially since managing the tyres of a fleet requires
technical knowledge and strict monitoring such as
would rule out this kind of practice.
(141) First, the extent of intra-Community tyre flows is
evidence that the market is Community-wide:
(143) It must be borne in mind that for a transport firm,(20) It should be borne in mind that these prices take account of the
especially when it has a large fleet, tyre management is amaximum rebates (which will be given only rarely) and that they
can in any event not be known until the end of a financial year. highly technical matter, involving assessment of the
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extent to which the tyre is worn and of the right time to vehicles, 5,6 % had 6 to 10 vehicles and only 12,8 %
had 11 vehicles or more. The proportion of smallintervene, the practice of rotating tyres to even out wear
and tear and prolong their useful lives, etc. It follows businesses had increased by comparison with 1985.
that for haulage professionals, the purchase of tyres is
difficult to dissociate from the service provided at the
same time by the dealer. Moreover, since action on the
tyres must be taken at specific times, it is difficult to see
(146) The same report states that most road haulage businesshow a haulier could seriously plan to obtain supplies
is done on local markets. Even in the countries whereabroad and store the tyres purchased in this way.
distances are the greatest (Italy), 50 % of freight is carried
for distances of less than 50 km, according to the report.
(147) An investigation by the Commission confirmed that
fleet policies with specific services and prices, targeting(144) A number of factors argue against the hypothesis put
firms with a large number of vehicles, are operated byforward by Michelin:
most of the large tyre manufacturers. The latter state
that this policy (and thus also the associated services) is
restricted to France. It is therefore clear that even if
certain haulage firms were tempted to make their
purchases abroad, this targeted marketing policy [...](i) technical monitoring: many facts contained in the file
would prevent them from doing so. In fact, the possi-reveal that constant technical monitoring of the
bility of this sub-market forming a relevant markettyre fleet is vital [...]. While it is true that 20 to
cannot be ruled out, given the price and distribution25 % of journeys in Europe are made with empty
characteristics specific to it. However, for the purposestrailers, it is unrealistic (given the need for regular
of this Decision, the matter has no favourable ortechnical monitoring of the tyres and for storage)
unfavourable consequences for Michelin and will thusfor hauliers to obtain supplies abroad item by item;
not be considered further.
(ii) language problems: since most haulage firms are (148) Thirdly, Michelin states that the international nature of
micro-enterprises (see below), the linguistic the tyre market has established itself in recent years with
obstacles to intra-Community trade are not incon- large-scale imports of tyres from Asia and eastern
siderable, especially since tyre dealing would be Europe.
secondary to the transport business and thus
without a specific budget (e.g. training in foreign
languages and in negotiating in them);
(149) There are two main reasons for refuting this argument.
(iii) targeted commercial policies: the development of
fixed-mileage contracts also undermines this
(150) First, the imports mentioned by Michelin almost exclus-hypothesis; ively involve ‘third line’ tyres (21), which compete only
to a very limited extent with the products that make up
the core of Michelin’s business. Second, these products
account for significantly less than 20 % of replacement
casings sold in Europe. Figures obtained from Eurostat
(iv) the structure of the road transport sector: this tends, in indicate that imports from outside the EU in 1996
France, to demonstrate that, in any event, only a represented only 6,2 % of sales of new truck tyres on
very small proportion of hauliers could afford to the French market (broken down as follows: central and
adopt such an approach. eastern Europe: 2 %; South East Asia including Japan:
3,3 %).
(145) According to the report by the group of wise men on (21) It should be noted that Michelin has taken control of certain
road haulage in the single market (1994), in 1990, of third line brands (Taurus and Stomil) to keep up with the
phenomenon.37 037 road haulage firms in France, 81,6 % had 1 to 5
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Table 12: Commercial flows of new truck tyres in 1996
Imports SE Asia Imports central Imports World
and Japan and eastern Europe excluding the EU15
Country Sales
Import % sales Import % sales Import % sales
France 2 806 000 (22) 92 881 3,3 57 120 2,0 174 395 6,2
Belgium-Luxemburg 434 000 32 914 7,6 5 427 1,3 58 191 13,4
Netherlands 341 000 206 406 60,5 42 748 12,5 311 731 91,4
Germany 4 095 000 350 563 8,6 114 696 2,8 549 568 13,4
Italy 2 342 000 48 567 2,0 144 182 6,2 310 175 13,2
United Kingdom 2 655 000 222 138 8,4 94 826 3,6 381 211 14,3
Ireland 171 000 70 862 41,4 5 324 3,1 186 744 ?
Denmark 215 000 48 623 22,6 10 130 4,7 62 182 28,9
Greece 262 000 79 882 30,5 22 214 8,5 178 722 68,2
Portugal 304 000 20 132 6,6 5 754 1,9 46 036 15,1
Spain 1 352 000 124 711 9,2 28 851 2,1 187 742 13,9
Sweden 338 000 77 652 23,0 7 487 2,2 96 456 28,5
Finland 210 000 14 625 7,0 5 089 2,4 19 809 9,4
Austria 411 000 3 670 0,9 55 514 13,5 65 147 15,8
Total EU 15 936 000 1 393 626 8,7 599 362 3,8 2 628 109 16,5
Source: Eurostat.
(151) Secondly, it can be noted that the French market is by In the specific context of this case, it is still justified
to define the relevant geographic market for newfar the least exposed to penetration by third line tyres
(taking as a reference a Community average of 16,5 % replacement truck tyres as the French domestic market.
and a Member State like the Netherlands with a pen-
etration rate of 91,4 %), a factor which further streng-
thens the particularly closed nature of the French market.
The market in retreaded tyres
(152) In conclusion, it is clear that none of the arguments put
(153) The retread market is manifestly a national market,forward by Michelin to support its theory are convincing.
especially in the case of France.
(22) Eurostat’s figures are quite different from the data supplied by
(154) In the first place, most manufacturers consulted by theMichelin. Doubtless, the customs data used here take account of
Commission by way of requests for information statedextra-market flows (importance of ports on the French market
and thus of transit). that the retreaded tyre market was national. Michelin
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itself confirmed in its reply to the Commission that the Michelin Franchised
group Bandag dealersretread market was national, since it was a market for
the provision of services, and thus a local market. Since
the retread market is a market for the provision of Norway [...] [...]
services, and services by definition cannot be stocked, it
is a local market and therefore at most of national Netherlands [...] [...]
dimension. Even in the case of mould-cure retreading,
Portugal [...] [...]where retreaders have mould-cure plants in only a few
countries, worn casings are managed on a national scale,
United Kingdom [...] [...]as indicated by Michelin.
Sweden [...] [...]
(155) Other factors also support this observation.
Switzerland [...] [...]
Source: Michelin.
(a) The structure of supply is heterogeneous within the
Community
(156) Marked differences, reflecting the very different market
shares of the manufacturers, are a feature of the Com- (b) The differences affecting the structure of demand within
munity landscape. The French market is distinguished in the Community help to set the French market apart
particular by the clearly dominant presence of Michelin,
which in 1995 had a market share of almost [...], while
Bandag, its nearest competitor, had a share of less than
[...] of the same market. In the other countries of western
(157) The differences in the structure of demand on theEurope, on the other hand, competitive relationships
retreading markets within the Community are marked.with other market players are different, sometimes to
The predominance of mould-cure retreading andthe detriment of Michelin, as illustrated by the following
custom retreading in France help to set the Frenchtable:
market apart. The mould-cure method implies the use
of industrial retreading plants, constraints connected
to the transport of the carcasses, long processing times
and especially an elaborate system for collecting the
carcasses. In these circumstances, the presence of an
intermediary (usually the specialised dealer) between
the retreader and the transport firm is virtually
indispensable. In countries where precure retreading isTable 13: Market shares of the two main players on the widespread, on the other hand, the specialised dealermarket for retreading tyres in western Europe in 1995
or the retreader do the retreading themselves, so that(%)
retreaders and transport firms are in direct contact
with one another.
Michelin Franchised
group Bandag dealers
Germany [...] [...]
Austria [...] [...]
(c) There are major price differences between the MemberBelgium [...] [...]
States
Denmark [...] [...]
Spain [...] [...]
(158) There are major differences in the prices charged in theFinland [...] [...]
various countries, whether the Commission takes into
account the price lists provided by Michelin or the post-France [...] [...]
rebate prices, a situation which reflects the lack of
homogeneity in competitive conditions in Europe. ThisGreece [...] [...]
is illustrated by a comparison of the price of a very
popular retread (Michelin 385/65 R 22.5 XZA) sold toItaly [...] [...]
dealers in six countries.
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Table 14
Listed invoice prices, France = 100 (%)
Year (23) France Spain Italy Germany Netherlands United Kingdom
1993 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1994 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1995 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1996 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
(FRF, at the exchange rate on the date given in the table)
Source: Michelin.
(159) Price differences by comparison with the French in the price of a retread [...] was [...].
market are considerable, both in 1993 and in 1996. In
1993 prices were lower [...], but much higher [...] and (160) If the Commission considers the price of the same tyre
after deduction of the invoice rebates, the table comesespecially [...]. There was a difference of almost [...] in
the price for the same tyre [...]. In 1996, the difference out as follows:
Table 15
Prices after deduction of the invoice rebates, France = 100 (%)
Year France Spain Italy Germany Netherlands United Kingdom
1993 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1994 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1995 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1996 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
(FRF, at the exchange rate on the date given in the table)
Source: Michelin.
(161) Lastly, if account is taken of the final net price after the full rebate:
Table 16
Net prices after deduction of the maximum rebates, France = 100 (%)
Year France Spain Italy Germany Netherlands United Kingdom
1993 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1994 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1995 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
1996 [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
(FRF, at the exchange rate on the date given in the table)
Source: Michelin.
(23) On 1 January of the relevant year.
31.5.2002 EN L 143/27Official Journal of the European Communities
(162) Here too, the final cost price paid by dealers is certainly (166) Two technical reasons:
lower depending on the rebates and/or benefits to which
they are entitled, which vary considerably from one
Member State to another, and on the commitments
— since retreading in France is mostly customwhich dealers decide they are prepared to make. For
retreading, time constraints mean that retreadingexample the ‘PRO’ premium (‘Agreement for optimum
units close to the customers are used, so thatuse of Michelin truck tyres’) exists in France and Spain,
dealers will rarely send the carcasses abroad,but not in Germany or the United Kingdom.
(163) Michelin itself is aware of the price differences at
— since the price of a retread is lower than the priceEuropean level since it considers that [...] (statement by
of a new tyre, the cost of transporting carcassesa Michelin working group on retreading made in a
represents a higher proportion of the final cost ofdocument obtained during the inspection visits).
a retread than of a new replacement tyre. This cost
could prove to be a major obstacle to intra-
Community trade.(164) A comparative analysis of repurchase prices for Michelin
carcasses per country also shows considerable price
variations. The following data were taken from tables
found on Michelin’s premises; they are for a type of tyre
that is commonly used for retreading:
(167) Two commercial reasons:
Table 17: Variations in the repurchase price for carcasses
in Europe
— carcass collection by mould-cure retreaders, includ-
315/80 R 22.5 365/80 R 20 ing Michelin, is essentially organised on a national6.12.95 3.5.96
scale,
Average price: [...] [...]
France [...] [...] — commercial terms and the rebate system set in
place by Michelin are strong incentives to special-
Germany [...] [...] ised dealers to send carcasses for retreading to the
national Michelin subsidiary. If dealers want to
Spain [...] [...] maximise their rebates, it is in their interest not to
diversify their purchases and to have their carcasses
Italy [...] [...] retreaded by the same retreader.
United Kingdom [...] [...]
Belgium [...] [...]
(168) The relevant geographic market for truck retreads will
Netherlands [...] [...] therefore be considered to be the French market.
Austria [...] [...]
Denmark [...] [...]
(169) Given the size of the French market in the products atGreece [...] [...]
issue, it is a substantial part of the common market
within the meaning of Article 82 of the EC Treaty.Sweden [...] [...]
Source: Michelin.
Limited purchases made outside France by special- Conclusion on the relevant markets
ised dealers
(165) Despite these price differences, it is extremely rare for
specialised dealers to make purchases outside France for (170) The replacement tyre for trucks and buses comprises
two relevant product markets, one being the market intwo technical and two commercial reasons:
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new replacement tyres and the other, the market in has considered that very large market shares are in
themselves evidence of a dominant position (26). In theretreads.
same judgment it found that if, for example, a firm had
a market share of 86 % (vitamin B 2) or even 75 %
(vitamin B 6 ‘95 % even when reduced by 20 %’), it
ranked as being in a dominant position. In 1991, in(171) For each of the two relevant product markets, the
its judgment in Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV vrelevant geographic market was found to be the French
Commission (27), the Court ruled that a market share ofmarket, in view of the absence of homogeneous competi-
50 % was in itself, save in exceptional circumstances,tive and commercial conditions on the national markets
evidence of the existence of a dominant position. Theand the limited tyre purchases made outside France by
Court stated: ‘With regard to market shares the Courtdealers.
has held that very large shares are in themselves, and
save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the
existence of a dominant position. That is the situation
where there is a market share of 50 % such as that found
to exist in this case’ (28).B. MICHELIN’S DOMINANT POSITION
(172) In its judgment in Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v (175) All the analyses combine to show that Michelin’s share
Commission (24) the Court of Justice defined a dominant of the two relevant markets has exceeded this threshold
position as a ‘position of economic strength enjoyed by consistently for more than twenty years.
an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective
competition being maintained on the relevant market
by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable
extent independently of its competitors, its customers
and ultimately of the consumers’. According to the
Court, ‘the existence of a dominant position may derive The market in new replacement tyres
from several factors which, taken separately, are not
necessarily determinative but among these factors a
highly important one is the existence of very large
market shares’ (25).
(176) The SNCP (Syndicat National du Caoutchouc et des
Plastiques — National Rubber and Plastics Union) calcu-
lated that Michelin had a 58,9 % share of the market in
new replacement tyres in 1995. Marketline Ltd, a(173) The successive analysis of three types of criterion leads
specialist in the sector, gave 55 % as Michelin’s marketto the conclusion that Michelin has a dominant position
share in one of its publications. Michelin argued that itson the relevant markets. First, a number of structural
market share was no more than [...]. Its competitorsindications, the most important of which is Michelin’s
estimate its market share at somewhere between 51 %market share, point to this conclusion. Second, an
and 65 %. Internal graphs and tables from Michelin’sanalysis of Michelin’s behaviour on the relevant markets
commercial policy division found during the 1997brings to light certain attitudes and practices which are
inspection visits show a stable market share of betweentypical of a company in a dominant position. The
[...]. Whatever the accuracy of each of these analyses,assessment is confirmed, lastly, by the position of
they all show that Michelin had a market share ofeconomic dependence in which specialised dealers find
more than [...] (29) throughout the reference period, andthemselves vis-à-vis Michelin, a necessary trading
knowing that Michelin itself acknowledges a marketpartner.
share of [...] for the beginning of the 1980s, it can be
supposed that Michelin has held a dominant position on
the French market in new replacement tyres for the last
twenty years and that its market share has remained at a
high level since the beginning of the decade.1. STRUCTURAL INDICATIONS OF THE DOMINANT POS-
ITION
(26) Loc. cit., paragraph 56, for example.(174) Since the Hoffmann-La Roche judgment, the Court
(27) [1991] ECR I-3359.
(28) Loc. cit., paragraph 60.
(29) In its reply to the request for information of 3 December 1996,
in a table reproduced at paragraph 132 of this Decision, Michelin
considers that it had a market share of only [...] in 1993, but
this statement contradicts the documents found on Michelin’s(24) [1979] ECR 461, at paragraph 38.
(25) Loc. cit., paragraph 39. premises.
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Table 18: Estimated market shares of the manufacturers The market in retreads
on the French market in new replacement tyres for trucks
(%)
(179) According to Michelin itself, Michelin and its subsidiary
Pneu Laurent held market shares above or equal [...]Marketline estimates Michelin
without interruption from 1985 to 1996 [...]. Theirestimates
most serious competitors were the Bandag dealers(1995)(1995) (1996)
(present only on the precure retreading market) with at
most [...] of the market during the period (and consider-Michelin 55,0 51,0 [...]
ably less at the beginning of the period), followed by the
Dunlop-SEIA-Pneu Holding, with a combined share of
Dunlop 9,0 9,0 [...] [...], then Goodyear at [...] and Continental at [...]. At the
beginning of the reference period, Michelin claims to
Goodyear 6,5 7,0 [...] have even reached a market share of [...].
Bridgesone/Firestone 12,5 9,0 [...]
Table 20: Estimated market shares of the French market
Continental/Uniroyal 5,0 6,5 [...] in truck retreads (%)
Pirelli 3,0 3,0 [...]
1994 1995 1996
Others (including third line) 9,0 14,5 [...]
Michelin [...] [...] [...]
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 [...]
Escoffier (Bandag dealer) [...] [...] [...]
SOCAP (Bandag dealer) [...] [...] [...]
(177) The following table contains data found in the manufac- Various (Bandag dealers) [...] [...] [...]
turer’s commercial policy division during the inspection
visit: Total Bandag [...] [...] [...]
ABR [...] [...] [...]Table 19: Estimated market share held by Michelin on
the market in new replacement tyres for trucks in six
European countries (%) Soreval [...] [...] [...]
Firestone France Pneus [...] [...] [...]1993 1994 1995 1996
Goodyear [...] [...] [...]France [...] [...] [...] [...]
TOTAL [...] [...] [...]Germany [...] [...] [...] [...]
Source: Michelin.Spain [...] [...] [...] [...]
United Kingdom
and Ireland [...] [...] [...] [...] (180) There can therefore be scarcely any doubt that Michelin
is in a dominant position on the retread market, given
Italy [...] [...] [...] [...] that very high market shares are in themselves, save in
exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of
a dominant position. Furthermore, this position ofBelgium [...] [...] [...] [...]
dominance is long-standing and is therefore incontest-
able.Total 6 countries [...] [...] [...] [...]
Source: Michelin.
2. OTHER EVIDENCE OF MICHELIN’S DOMINANT POS-
ITION
(178) In any event, all the manufacturers and studies consulted
unanimously affirm that Michelin has a market share
five to six times greater than its closest competitor, (181) A number of features of Michelin’s business actively
explain why it is so powerful on the relevant markets.Dunlop, which controls barely [...] of the market.
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(182) Michelin’s technical lead is undeniable. It launched the (185) Lastly, the spontaneous demand shown by large trans-
port firms is evidence that French transport firms stillradial tyre in 1948 and is still the world’s leading
manufacturer of radial tyres today. Although the original have a preference for Michelin products. There are
several reasons for this: the considerable lead Michelinpatents for the radial tyre expired some years ago and
licences have been granted to other manufacturers since had in the past, the brand’s position on the original
equipment market, the effectiveness of the sales force on1956, Michelin still has particular expertise in the field.
In addition, it has been carrying out extensive research the ground and the retreadability rate of the carcasses,
which is often higher for Michelin tyres than for otherfor a number of years on the ‘green tyre’, which is being
marketed under the name ‘Energy’. brands. Distributors consider the rate of spontaneous
demand to be high in France. Michelin estimates that it
represents [...].
(183) This indisputable technological lead is the result primar-
ily of the major investments Michelin has been able to
Michelin’s strong presence on adjacent marketsmake out of its extensive financial resources. It has
consistently pursued an active policy of research and
innovation. Its research and technological development
(RTD) budget runs to [...] of its turnover, which is well (186) Michelin’s strong presence on adjacent markets acts to
above those of its largest competitors. The RTD budgets its advantage on the replacement and retread markets.
of Goodyear, Bridgestone/Firestone, Continental, Pirelli The barrier to competitors’ entering the relevant markets
and Dunlop are [...],[...],[...],[...] and [...] respectively (30). is far from being negligible.
(187) On the market in new replacement tyres, Michelin has a
dual advantage over its competitors. First, its very strong(184) The Michelin brand is in a position to offer a wide range
of different tyre products such that an ever increasing position on the market in original equipment truck tyres
cannot but be beneficial. It is the preferred supplier ofnumber of customer groups is reached. In France, the
range is wider than that offered by other manufacturers the French heavy vehicle manufacturer and market
leader, Renault.and its quality and reputation are indisputable.
Table 21: Shares of the European market in original equipment truck tyres (%)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Michelin [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
Continental [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
Goodyear [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
Bridgestone [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
Pirelli [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
Dunlop [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
Others [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
Source: Michelin.
(30) According to European Tyre Report 1996, European Rubber
Journal, September 1996.
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(188) Michelin has a [...] share of the European market, which Michelin’s omnipresent commercial and technical ser-
vice on the groundis four times that of its nearest competitor and nearly six
times that of the next in line. This undeniably puts
Michelin in a very advantageous position, since there is
no doubt that users tend, even if only to a limited extent,
to remain loyal to the brand of tyre originally fitted on
their vehicles. (191) Michelin has close on fifty logistics platforms and local
centres in France, to which are attached several hundred
technico-commercial representatives that ensure who
Michelin is well represented among dealers.
(189) Second, Michelin has a strong presence on all the new
replacement tyre markets, which is not true of the other
manufacturers, as illustrated in the table below:
(192) Although Michelin’s competitors also have sales forces,
they are far less numerous and significantly less struc-
tured. Michelin’s sales force in the heavy-vehicle sector
comprises more than [...] agents (31), whereas none of itsTable 22: Market shares held by Michelin and its main
competing manufacturers has sales teams of more thancompetitors on various tyre markets in France in 1995
forty people. Michelin can therefore defend its market
position extremely well, knowing that its competitors
Agricultural are not in a position to campaign so intensively amongPassengerMarket Plant vehiclescar Motorbike final consumers. Furthermore, [...].Manufacturers (RT) (driven(OE+RT) wheels)
Michelin [...] [...] [...] [...]
Bridgestone [...] [...] [...] [...] Michelin’s leading position in French distribution
channels
Continental [...] [...] [...] [...]
Goodyear [...] [...] [...] [...]
Dunlop [...] [...] [...] [...] (193) In the highly fragmented truck tyre distribution sector,
Michelin has a very strong position, as was made evident
Pirelli [...] [...] [...] [...] in the previous section. Via its integrated distribution
network Euromaster, Michelin directly controls some
Source: Michelin. [...] sales outlets of the 2 225 on French territory. This
figure represents [...] of sales outlets, but [...] of all
sales outlets that belong to manufacturers’ integrated
networks. While Dunlop controls [...] sales outlets, three
times less than Michelin, Bridgestone/Firestone controls
only [...], and the other manufacturers, none at all.
(190) On the retread market, Michelin has the major advantage
of being the only manufacturer to have a strong position
on this market and on the new tyre market. In France,
Michelin has a share of some [...] of the retread market,
well ahead of its nearest competitor, the network of (194) The same situation applies to the ‘clubs’, arrangements
Bandag franchisees, which is itself independent of the for closer partnerships with certain specialised dealers
other manufacturers. Michelin is therefore the only set in place by the manufacturers. With a total of [...]
manufacturer able to offer large-scale ‘in-house’ members covering [...] sales outlets, the ‘Michelin Friends
retreading of its own casings. This situation is of Club’ represents a very large majority of all sales outletsconsiderable relevance when it comes to analysing the belonging to a ‘club’. If the Euromaster sales outlets are
manufacturer’s market power. Michelin bases its entire added to the Club members, this comes to roughly a
communication on the fact that its tyres are designed third of sales outlets in France.from the outset to have four lives. This means that,
although they cost more than competitors’ tyres at the
time of purchase, the cost price per kilometre of Michelin
tyres is very competitive. This sales argument, based
essentially on the promotion of retreading by the
manufacturer downstream, helps to increase Michelin’s
market power. (31) Michelin commercial strategy document.
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(195) The market power Michelin derives from this more or position. The possession of very large market shares and
significant comparative advantages, combined with theless direct control of distribution is illustrated by a
comparison of the manufacturers’ market shares of each weakness of its competitors, place Michelin in a position
of power which allow it to behave independently in aof the various distribution channels. This table was
found on Michelin’s premises and applies to all of manner typical of a firm in a dominant position.
Europe; it can be deduced from two principal arguments
that the situation is at least the same, if not more
advantageous, on the French market:
Michelin’s behaviour is strong evidence of its domi-
— Michelin’s position on all tyre markets is stronger nant position
in France than in the other Member States,
— for historical reasons, Euromaster and the ‘Club’ (197) A detailed analysis of a number of aspects of Michelin’sare more developed on the French market than conduct provides further support in so far as necessaryelsewhere in Europe. for the conclusion, based on observation of the structural
aspects of the market, that a dominant position exists.
Table 23: Comparison of Michelin’s shares of the replace-
ment truck tyre market by distribution channel in Europe
in 1994 (%)
The practice of offering loyalty rebates and a net price
differential compared with competitorsNumber of Michelin’sDistribution channel sales outlets market share
Euromaster [...] [...] (198) The business practice of granting a wide range of loyalty
rebates that are paid very late is also a clear indication of
Continental network [...] [...] Michelin’s dominant position. The fact that dealers until
at least 1997 were prepared to sell Michelin tyres at a
loss in the expectation of rebates that were finally paidDunlop network [...] [...]
in February of the following year is evidence of the
manufacturer’s market power.Goodyear network [...] [...]
Pirelli network [...] [...]
(199) This practice will be examined in more detail later from
Bridgestone network [...] [...] the point of view of its being such as to constitute an
abuse in itself. However, it is appropriate to mention it
here as evidence of the dominant position. In itsOther networks [...] [...]
judgment in Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission
the Court stressed the need, in order to determineTotal for competitors’ networks [...] [...]
whether a company is in a dominant position, to
analyse the competitive situation on the relevant market,
Total for controlled networks [...] [...] specifying that ‘in doing so it may be advisable to take
account if need be of the facts put forward as acts
Michelin Club [...] [...] amounting to abuses without necessarily having to
acknowledge that they are abuses’ (32).
Total independent specialised
dealers [...] [...]
Total specialised dealers [...] [...] 3. THE SPECIALISED DEALERS’ DEPENDENCE ON MICHE-
LIN MAKES THE LATTER AN UNAVOIDABLE PARTNER
Other channels [...] [...]
Direct consumer sales [...] [...] (200) Lastly, a third important indication of Michelin’s domi-
nant position is the fact that the specialised dealers
TOTAL [...] [...] manifestly appear to be placed despite themselves in
a situation of dependence that makes Michelin an
unavoidable partner.Source: Michelin.
(196) All these aspects of the structural analysis of the relevant
markets suffice to show that Michelin is in a dominant (32) [1978] ECR 207, at paragraphs 67 and 68.
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(201) The resentment towards Euromaster expressed plainly reasonably decide not to work with Michelin. This
evidence corresponds to the position taken by the Courtby independent specialised dealers (33), who nevertheless
would not consider doing without Michelin, is clear in the NBIM case.
evidence of the fact that no dealer concerned about its
credibility can eliminate Michelin tyres from its sales
outlet. A dealer that did not sell new Michelin tyres or
did not send its carcasses for retreading to Michelin or
Pneu Laurent (Michelin’s subsidiary) would run the risk (205) Added to this is the fact that, in general, following the
of weakening its commercial credibility. way opened by Michelin, manufacturers are involved
more and more directly in distribution, either via the
development of direct contacts with final users, or via
their vertical integration in dealers’ networks. If we add
to this the appearance of new distribution networks
(especially the networks of truck tyre manufacturers),
(202) The need for traders to include in their range a product we find that independent specialised dealers are losing
which is subject to heavy demand, as is the case here, their share of the market in distributing truck tyres,
necessarily establishes a relationship of dependence which was their traditional ‘strong point’.
which makes the supplier in question an unavoidable
partner. It should be pointed out in this connection that
this situation was identified by the Court in its 1983
NBIM judgment as a fact that legitimately helped to
establish Michelin’s dominant position on the Nether-
(206) These three facts make competition between dealerslands market. The Court stated at the time that ‘a dealer
very keen and margins small (in 1995, for example, theestablished in the Netherlands normally cannot afford
average operating margin of French specialised dealersnot to sell Michelin tyres’ (34).
was 3,7 % of their turnover). Under this pressure,
independent dealers are constrained to obtain the best
terms possible when purchasing Michelin products,
especially as regards truck tyres. In order to preserve the
competitive edge on which their survival probably
depends, dealers do not hesitate to take part in the(203) Most specialised dealers sell not only heavy-duty tyres
majority of ‘programmes’ and ‘agreements’ that they arefor trucks, but also a wide range of other types of tyre,
offered, if as a result they can benefit from rebatesespecially tyres for passenger cars and vans, as well as
or other additional economic advantages. Very slightoffering ‘after-sales’ tyre services. However, in recent
variations in the rebate rates can prove to be essential toyears the specialised dealers have lost a large proportion
the dealers, who will do their best to make the most ofof the passenger car tyre market to other distribution
them.channels (car centres, superstores, car manufacturers’
networks, etc.). This means that the truck tyre business
is taking up an increasing share of their turnover
(according to the magazine Achat automobile actualité, it
represents around 60 % of their turnover) and is
becoming crucial to their survival. (207) In its reply to the statement of objections, Michelin
rejects the argument that it is a necessary partner on the
grounds that only 17 % of the dealers questioned
supported that point of view and of [...] dealers on the
Michelin lists, [...] had not bought tyres from Michelin.
One can reply to this, first, that, given the fact that ‘Club’
dealers were in a majority of those questioned, the(204) It is clear that specialised dealers are placed despite
spontaneous declaration rate of 17 % is very high, beingthemselves in a situation of economic dependence that
well over the ratio of independent dealers, and second,makes Michelin an unavoidable partner. It is very
that the spontaneous demand rate for Michelin productsunlikely that dealers can ignore Michelin without
of 50 % to 70 % is sufficiently convincing. Moreover,endangering their credibility and their business. Given
Michelin seems to forget that only [...] dealers deal inthe brand’s market shares and the rate of spontaneous
truck tyres and that it is not at all relevant to give figuresdemand (between 50 % and 70 % in France, according
for the entire tyre sector (in this case [...] dealers,to the requests for information sent by the Commission
including supermarkets) here.to the specialised dealers), it is a fact that a dealer cannot
(208) All the evidence outlined above helps to establish beyond
doubt that Michelin is in a dominant position on the(33) See, for example, a dealer’s reply, and the reply by dealers to
French markets in new replacement and retreaded tyresquestion 20 of the Article 11 letter of 27 October 1997.
(34) Loc. cit. (see footnote 15), at paragraph 56. for heavy vehicles.
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C. THE ABUSIVE NATURE OF MICHELIN’S pricing policy in France with regard to resellers which
COMMERCIAL POLICY was based on a complex system of rebates, discounts
and/or various financial benefits whose main objective
was to tie resellers to it and to maintain its market
shares, which must be regarded as an abuse within the
(209) An abuse of a dominant position was defined by the meaning of Article 82.
Court of Justice in its Hoffmann-La Roche judgment as
‘an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an
undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to
influence the structure of a market where, as a result of
the very presence of the undertaking in question, the
(214) Michelin’s abusive commercial policy on the two rel-degree of competition is weakened and which, through
evant product markets (i.e. on both the market for newrecourse to methods different from those which con-
replacement tyres and the market for retreads) as regardsdition normal competition in products or services on
specialist dealers consisted of three components overthe basis of the transactions of commercial operators,
the relevant period: the ‘General price conditions forhas the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree
France for professional dealers’ (for convenience, theof competition still existing in the market or the growth
individual ‘Commercial cooperation agreements’ will beof that competition’ (35).
included in this category, since they are merely an
extension of the general conditions), the ‘Agreement
for the optimum use of Michelin truck tyres’ (PRO
Agreement), and the ‘Business cooperation and service(210) Abuse of a dominant position may thus involve practices
assistance agreement’ (known as the Michelin Friendswhich have as their object or which may have as their
Club).effect the elimination of competitors, or behaviour
which an undertaking could not adopt without com-
promising its own interest on a competitive market or
on a market where it did not have a dominant position.
1. GENERAL PRICE CONDITIONS FOR FRANCE FOR PRO-
FESSIONAL DEALERS(211) The Court of Justice has indicated the limits of this
concept, notably by stating in the United Brands judg-
ment (36) that ‘although it is true that the fact that an
undertaking is in a dominant position cannot disentitle
it from protecting its own commercial interests if they
are attacked, and that such an undertaking must be (215) These conditions allowed dealers to benefit from quan-
conceded the right to take such reasonable steps as it tity rebates, service bonuses and progress bonuses and,
deems appropriate to protect its said interests, such possibly, to sign commercial agreements with Michelin.
behaviour cannot be countenanced if its actual purpose
is to strengthen this dominant position and abuse it’.
(212) This is exactly what has occurred in the case in point. (a) Quantity rebates
Michelin, which has long held a dominant position in
France, sought to exercise its influence in such a way as
to ensure that it maintained its hold on the market. The
last few decades have seen the arrival of competitors to
Michelin which, having gradually caught up with it, are
(216) Quantity rebates took the form of an annual rebate as anow able to market products which are competitive in
percentage of total turnover (trucks, cars and vans)terms of quality and price. In France, its traditional
achieved with Michelin France. To be eligible, the dealerstronghold, Michelin has had to take action in order to
had to achieve the turnover thresholds provided for inmaintain its dominant position. The action it took was
the rebate grids. In the first Michelin case (NBIMnot based on the methods which condition normal
judgment, referred to above), and consistently in morecompetition.
recent cases, the Court of Justice has ruled against the
granting of quantity rebates by an undertaking in a
dominant position where the rebates exceed a reasonable
period of three months (as is the case here) on the(213) Since at least the beginning of the 1980s and up to and
grounds that such a practice is not in line with normalincluding 1998, Michelin pursued a commercial and
competition based on prices. Merely buying a small
additional quantity of Michelin products made the dealer
eligible for a rebate on the whole of the turnover
achieved with Michelin and this was greater than the fair
marginal or linear return on the additional purchase,(35) Loc cit. (see footnote 24), at paragraph 91.
(36) See footnote 32. which clearly creates a strong buying incentive effect. In
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the Court’s view, a rebate can only correspond to the him to base his choice on objective figures, since the
overall uncertainty as to the final price of Michelin tyreseconomies of scale achieved by the firm as a result of
the additional purchases which consumers are induced made any serious comparison with competitors’ prices
impossible.to make.
(222) Secondly, as has just been noted, dealers were obliged,
(217) In addition, since the rebates were not paid until up to 1995 at least (37), to resell Michelin tyres at a loss,
February in the year following that in which the tyre their profit margin on them being re-established only
purchases were made (Michelin is the only company when the rebates were paid. The precarious situation in
which applies this practice, since all its competitors pay which this placed the dealers was clearly unfair and is a
most of their rebates immediately), the following abuses measure of the extent to which Michelin abused its
were evident: position as a necessary business partner. If there were
undistorted competition between suppliers, it is difficult
to see how dealers would of their own accord have
opted to place themselves in such an unfavourable
position in business terms.
Unfair practice
(223) Thirdly, in view of the fact that the rebates were
paid extremely late, dealers were forced to enter into
quantitative commitments to Michelin (in connection
with the progress bonus) before they had even received(218) Given the intensity of competition and the low level of
the quantity rebates for the previous year. This wasmargins in the sector (about 3,7 % according to the
unfair not only because the dealers were placed in aCommission’s investigation), dealers were obliged to
weak psychological position during negotiations, butresell at a loss pending the payment of the rebates. The
also because, during the negotiations, they were not ableprice paid to Michelin was generally higher than the
to base themselves on a reliable estimate of their costprice charged by the dealer to final consumers. The
prices and thus to determine their business strategydealer thus initially sold ‘at a loss’. It was only when he
freely. Most of the competitors granted the bulk of theirwas paid the various ‘bonuses’ and premiums that the
rebates immediately.reseller recovered his costs and re-established his profit
margin.
(224) Fourthly, the resellers had to accept cash flow losses
since they were reselling at a loss during the period
between their purchase of Michelin tyres and the pay-(219) The unfairness of the rebate system was thus the
ment of the rebates, which placed an undue financialcumulative result of several factors.
burden on them.
(220) Firstly, and contrary to what Michelin argues in its reply (225) In its reply to the statement of objections, Michelin
to the statement of objections, the dealers could not rejects the third and fourth points, arguing that ‘except
know with certainty the final purchasing price of in the case of a new dealer ... the system of annual
Michelin tyres. Since the rebates applied to all of the quantity rebates works as if the supplier were providing
Michelin turnover and were calculated only about one the dealer at the start of the year with a large sum which
year after the start of the first purchases, it was not the reseller could use as he saw fit’. This argument
possible for the dealers to know, before the very last confirms the fact that the system produced effects
orders had been placed, what the real unit purchase involving loss-making resales and cash flow losses, at
price of the tyres would be, which placed them in a least in cases where the dealer was in his first year of
situation of uncertainty and insecurity, prompting them business, but especially (a fact which Michelin also
to minimise their risks by purchasing mainly from forgets) in cases where the dealer had stopped purchasing
Michelin. Michelin products and then began to purchase them
again or in cases where sales in year n+1 did not exceed
(221) If nevertheless a dealer wished to diversify by purchasing
from other suppliers, it would have been difficult for (37) As from 1996, Michelin offered to spread rebate payments.
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those in year n. The Commission cannot agree with extent at Michelin’s expense since this could have
jeopardised his ability to reach the rebate threshold andMichelin’s view that a sum paid with a time lag of up to
13 months can be regarded as ‘a large sum of money could thus have had a major effect on the overall cost
price of the Michelin tyres purchased over the year. Thismade available to a dealer’.
loyalty-inducing effect applied both to new tyres and to
retreads.
Loyalty-inducing effects
(230) As far as new tyres are concerned, in 1995, for example,(226) In view of the long reference period (one year), resellers
the rate of rebate varied each time the turnover thresholdwere under increasing pressure to purchase from Miche-
was crossed, ranging from 1 % at the bottom of the scalelin. Once again, the low level of profit margins was a
to 0,05 % at the top of the scale. Thus, for example, astrong incentive to earn an additional rebate, even if
dealer achieving a turnover of FRF 9 000 with Michelinsmall, since it would at all events directly boost the
received a rebate of 7,50 %, whereas if he achievedfirm’s profit margin.
FRF15 000, the rebate rose to 8,50 %. A factor which
considerably increased the pressure was that a final extra
order of truck tyres allowing the higher scale to be
reached affected the dealer’s profit margin on sales of
(227) A detailed analysis of the quantity rebates introduced by new Michelin tyres in all categories (except retreads and
Michelin shows that this system of rebates, similar to tyres for heavy plant). Finally, here again, it was relatively
that ruled against by the Court of Justice in 1983, has as easy, particularly at the lower end of the scale, to move
its object and effect the tying of dealers to Michelin and up the steps of the scale, since there were a lot of them
that ‘in providing an advantage not based on any (47 in 1995). It should also be noted that, at the top of
economic service justifying it, the discount tends to the scale, it was in the dealer’s interest to go beyond the
remove or restrict the buyer’s freedom to choose his maximum figure stipulated, since this allowed him to
sources of supply’ and thus ‘to bar competitors from sign a ‘commercial agreement’ with Michelin, with all
access to the market’ (38). the advantages which this involved.
(228) Up until the end 1996, most of the rebates or refunds
were established on the basis of the calendar year of
invoicing. Most of the bonuses (in particular, quantity
rebates and progress premiums) were granted on the
(231) In its reply to the statement of objections, Michelinbasis of the quantities sold during the previous year.
merely observes on this point that, in the examplesAny system under which rebates are granted according
mentioned above, ‘1 % of FRF 15 000 is only FRF 150,to the quantities sold during a relatively long reference
[…] a very modest sum’. However, for a dealer earningperiod has the inherent effect, at the end of that period,
on average a margin of only 3,7 %, an additional 1 %of increasing pressure on the buyer to reach the purchase
rebate on the whole of his Michelin purchases is clearlyfigure needed to obtain the discount or to avoid suffering
quite substantial.the foreseeable loss for the entire period.
(229) Since it was essential, for the dealer’s very survival in
certain cases, to receive as large as possible an amount
of quantity rebates (these being the only means of
restoring the dealer’s profit margin) and in view of the (232) The fact, with regard to new tyres, that the quantity
extremely long period over which Michelin recorded rebates are calculated by reference to the whole of the
orders, a dealer could not take the risk at any given turnover in all categories of Michelin tyre might suggest,
moment of diversifying his range to any significant at first sight, that there was an escape route for avoiding
the loyalty-inducing effect on the truck tyre market. A
dealer wishing to achieve a given additional rebate level
without placing an additional truck-tyre order could
have opted to purchase instead more Michelin car tyres.
In fact, however, this assumption does not stand up to(38) NBIM judgment, referred to above (see footnote 15), at para-
graph 73. closer analysis.
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(233) Firstly, given the unit cost differences between a car tyre A rebate of 2 % was granted as from FRF 7 000, 3 % as
from FRF 7 400 and 3,5 % as from FRF 8 000. Inand a truck tyre, any such attempt to offset purchases
would have required the dealer to purchase a signifi- 1995 and 1996, for example, there were 18 steps in the
scale, which made it fairly easy, particularly at thecantly larger quantity of car tyres to achieve the same
turnover. Secondly, since car tyres are already included bottom of the scale, to move up to higher steps. This
again was an incentive to achieve additional purchases.in the calculation of quantity rebates, only an additional
purchase of car tyres (over and above the dealer’s ‘usual’
purchases) would have been sufficient, for the purpose
of obtaining a given rebate, to offset the lack of any
additional truck tyre order. However, each dealer has his
(237) It should be noted in this respect that, in the earlierown customer base structure, and it would be unrealistic
Michelin case (NBIM judgment), the Court took the viewto believe that a dealer could significantly (at least in the
that a variation of 0,2 % to 0,4 % could place the dealershort term) alter the proportions of his tyre sales
under sufficient pressure to induce him to make all or aaccounted for by car tyres and by truck tyres. In other
substantial part of his purchases from the dominantwords, a dealer could not suddenly decide to sell more
undertaking, especially at the end of the period.car tyres than truck tyres, since the markets are quite
distinct.
(238) In its reply to the statement of objections, Michelin also
argues that, in the earlier Michelin judgment, the Court(234) Consequently, turnover-offsetting by means of car tyre
regarded the lack of transparency in the system ofsales was not a realistic means of escape for the reseller.
rebates as a crucial factor in determining that MichelinAt all events, even if such a means of escape existed, it
NV’s commercial policy constituted an abuse, and thatwould have only a very limited impact, and it would
this meant that the French company’s commercial policycertainly not allow the conclusion to be drawn that the
did not constitute an abuse on the grounds that ‘theapplication of quantity rebates to the whole of the
rebates which had been challenged were not loyaltyturnover in Michelin products did not have a loyalty-
rebates prohibited under Community case law’.inducing effect on the market for truck tyres.
(239) The Commission believes that Michelin’s analysis is(235) It should be noted additionally that Michelin states in its
mistaken, since the Court does not regard the lack ofreply to the statement of objections (39) that ‘at the start
transparency in rebates as an essential condition for anof the year, Michelin drew up with each dealer a table
abuse to have been committed. It should also begiving an estimate, by product category, of the rebates
stressed that the lack of transparency is not one of theto which the dealer was entitled for the current year’. It
Commission’s objections with regard to the system ofwas thus evident that, although contractually the rebates
quantity rebates. What the Commission is challengingapplied to the turnover in respect of all categories, this
in the system of quantity rebates is the uncertainty inwas not the case in practice, as Michelin’s own comments
which the dealer is placed with regard to the referencemake clear.
framework used (the final total amount of sales of
Michelin products over one year), which was an unfair
practice and created a loyalty-inducing effect. It is
important to note, however, that the Commission
(236) The loyalty-inducing effect made itself felt even more considers that the ‘General conditions of sale’ taken as aclearly in the case of retreads, since this category had its whole do constitute a non-transparent system since, asown table of rebates: the variations in the rate of the explained below, the service bonus and the progressrebate resulting from a final order for retreads during a bonus involve the earning of points and the definitionyear affected the dealer’s profit margin in respect of the of ‘bases’ which rest not on objective, but on subjectivetotal amount of retread sales for the whole of the year. factors.There was no escape route here: consequently, small
variations could put appreciable pressure on resellers,
and, in this instance, the variations were not inconsider-
able. In 1995, for example, the variations in the rate of
quantity rebates when turnover thresholds were crossed
Market-partitioning effect (and foreclosing effect)ranged from 2 % at the bottom of the scale to 0,1% at
the top of the scale. Thus, a dealer achieving a turnover
of less than FRF 7 000 with Michelin received no rebate.
(240) The rebates applied only to purchases made from
Michelin France and thus discouraged purchases made
abroad or from importers. Conversely, the high level of
prices in France, before rebates, discouraged purchases(39) Statement of objections, p. 122. Note: the underlining of the
phrase ‘by product category’ has been added by the Commission. in France from abroad.
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(241) The foreclosure effect was particularly noteworthy with rebate system. Tyre exports were as a result clearly
limited. Secondly, dealers in other European countriesregard to competitors: thanks to its market shares,
Michelin was able to absorb the cost of these rebates, were not able to receive the rebates granted to the
French resellers.while its competitors were unable to do likewise and
therefore had to either accept a lower level of profitability
or give up the idea of increasing their sales volume.
(246) This policy made parallel imports difficult and parti-
tioned markets, and this explains, firstly, the relatively
low level of imports and, secondly, the maintenance of
a national market for new replacement tyres. This
(242) The market-partitioning effect brought about by the isolated the French market, enabling Michelin to have a
method of calculating the rebates is clear. Since only dominant influence there, without any risk of external
purchases made from Michelin France could be taken influences.
into account, the dealer was obliged to purchase essen-
tially through this distribution channel, which seriously
restricted his scope for obtaining Michelin tyre supplies
(247) As regards retreads, the specific features of the Frenchfrom the group’s foreign subsidiaries and thus allowed
market made it more difficult for the dealer to decide tothe manufacturer to exercise tight control over the
have customers’ casings retreaded in other Membermarket.
States. However, in cases where this would have been
possible (frontier areas, for example) and where the
desire to do so existed, the system established by
Michelin prevented any such practice. The end-of-year
rebates were always calculated by reference to the
(243) A dealer could in theory have chosen to make all his purchases made from Michelin’s French subsidiary, and
purchases in another European country and thus to the purchases made there by dealers were also recorded
benefit from the conditions in that country. However, in order to check whether the dealer had achieved the
he would have had to bear the transport costs involved thresholds for access to certain programmes. As a result,
in any such decision and in particular to forgo the dealers also had a strong incentive not to diversify their
technical assistance provided by Michelin France, which suppliers.
is crucial in such a trade-specific market as the truck tyre
market, where ongoing customer service and the ability
to provide technical advice are major factors in the
dealer’s appeal to customers.
(b) The service bonus
(248) This bonus had the same features as the quantity rebates,
except that the minimum turnover thresholds were(244) Dealers could also consider obtaining their supplies
imposed by Michelin. The amount of the bonus wasfrom importers, as was indeed the case with a small part
linked to the number of points obtained under anof the market. However, there are limits to such supplies,
assessment grid essentially regarding the quality ofsince importers are not always able to guarantee them,
service.particularly for the whole range of tyres which a
dealer needs. Importers generally market only the most
common tyre sizes. For the other sizes, dealers necess-
arily had to obtain their supplies from Michelin. How-
(249) The service bonus was unfair because of the way inever, Michelin granted most of the bonuses on the whole
which it was fixed. It also had a loyalty-inducing effectrange of categories and, at all events, did not do so by
and was in the nature of a tied sale in view of some ofreference to the type of tyre. In order to remain
its clauses.competitive, the importer would have had to offset not
only the cost of transport, but also the dealer’s loss of
bonuses on the whole range of Michelin tyres, including
those not bought from the importer.
Unfairness
(250) The granting of the points was somewhat subjective and
gave Michelin a margin of discretion in its assessment.(245) Dealers in other European countries could obtain sup-
plies in France only with great difficulty, a factor which In addition, some of the points depended on the
provision of very precise strategic information on thein addition was discriminatory. In the first place, the
rebate system meant that the prices for sale to the public market (from 1980 to 1992), which was not in the
dealer’s interest (no return in the form of studies, forand/or the prices less invoice rebates were higher than
those charged in the countries in which there is no example).
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(251) As noted in the previous section describing the operation obtain additional points if his purchase of new products
amounted to a specific percentage in relation to theof the bonus, Michelin was able, through the bonus, to
make a subjective assessment that affected the amount of regional share of such products. However, since the
earning of points did not depend on quantities, but onthe bonus to be granted. This allowed the manufacturer’s
representative to put strong pressure on the dealer the achievement of a given percentage in relation to the
regional share of such products, this was a variant of aas regards future commitments and allowed him, if
necessary, to use the arrangement in a discriminatory loyalty bonus which must be regarded as an abuse where
it is required by an undertaking in a dominant position.manner.
The heading constituted an improper incentive to pro-
mote new Michelin products at the expense of compet-
ing products. The dealer was unlikely to risk the loss of
two points that could result in a reduction in the total
(252) Some of the headings were by their very nature subjec- amount of his annual bonus. He was thus forced in
tive in their assessment and/or the number of points most cases to comply with the regional market share
granted could vary ‘depending on the quality of the percentages set by Michelin.
service provided’ (40). However, the tally of the points
scored was calculated by Michelin’s representative, who
also set the targets and the corresponding points for the
current year. Michelin’s ability to unilaterally decrease
the bonus during the year if the targets were not met is
yet another factor which enabled Michelin to make the
conditions granted to dealers dependent on its subjective
assessment. Michelin’s argument that use was made of
(255) Michelin points out, in its reply to the statement ofthis possibility only in exceptional cases does not alter
objections, that, in order to obtain the maximum bonus,the fact that it was an abuse. In addition, a number of
it was sufficient to obtain 31 points out of the 35 listedreplies given by dealers to the requests for information
in the sheet and that a dealer could thus have copedmake matters clear: ‘The assessment made is dependent
with the loss of the ‘abusive’ points in question. Theon Michelin’s goodwill’ or again: ‘Michelin can use this
Commission would emphasise here that, even in 1996,bonus in whatever way it wants. We have had unilateral
the abusive points ‘market information’ and ‘serviceschanges imposed on us’. Another dealer explains that he
new products’ represented five points, and, as regardshas been subject to retaliatory measures in the form
retreads and the exclusive aspect linked to them, twoof the ‘drastic reduction of certain bonuses: service
additional points. Thus, it would have been impossiblebonus’ (41).
for a dealer to obtain the maximum points without an
infringement of the competition rules. Furthermore, it
was easier for the dealer to earn these points which,
though abusive, cost little, than to improve the quality
(253) Having regard to the particular responsibility of an of the plant and equipment of the sales outlet, or the
undertaking in a dominant position, this kind of subjec- service provided to customers, nor can Michelin defend
tivity and/or margin of discretion, being almost inevi- the abusive nature of a particular point by arguing that
tably a source of discrimination, must be regarded as an others are not abusive.
abuse within the meaning of Article 82 of the EC Treaty.
Loyalty-inducing effect
A tying effect which is, by its nature, loyalty-inducing:
(254) Up to 1992, points were granted if the dealer achieved a
minimum percentage of purchases of Michelin products.
Meeting this target set by Michelin as part of the service
bonus greatly strengthened the links between Michelin
and dealers by means of a loyalty-inducing effect which
must be regarded as a abuse. Up to 1992 at least, a
heading ‘service new products’ enabled the dealer to
(256) One point was granted if the dealer committed himself
to systematically returning used Michelin tyres to Miche-
lin for retreading. The service bonus was thus also a
means of achieving tied sales, an abuse which enabled
Michelin to use its dominant position on the market for(40) For example, twice as many points could, in certain cases, be
new truck tyres to enhance its position on the adjacentgranted for the assessment ‘excellent’ as for the assessment ‘good’.
(41) Replies to the request for information of 17 December 1997. retread market.
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(257) As from 1992, the service bonus awarded the dealer an lin’s representative exercised implicit control over the
fixing of the bases, by means of the following arrange-additional point if he systematically had Michelin casings
retreaded by Michelin. As from 1996, it was awarded ‘if ments (truck tyres):
he systematically has the first retreading of Michelin
casings done by Michelin’. The possible loss of that point
and the possible reduction in the total amount of the — choice between the level achieved in the previous
annual bonus that could be earned meant a direct year or the average for the last two or three years.
increase in the unit cost of all the tyres purchased from Sometimes, the base agreed the previous year was
Michelin, since the dealer lost not only the bonus on taken as the reference,
retreads, but also that linked to the whole of his turnover
with Michelin.
— application (to the number of tyres) of a uniform
regional coefficient, established on the basis of
Michelin’s forecast on how the market would
develop. Michelin’s ambitions on a given market
(258) The manufacturer thus used its position in the tyre trade were taken into account here, often in terms of
in general and in the market for new truck tyres in market shares. In 1994, for example, the coefficient
particular as a means of ensuring that dealers had was in all cases negative, except in one of the seven
retreads carried out by it. Dealers could not risk loosing sectors making up the French market. In 1995 and
a rebate on the total annual turnover with Michelin by 1996, it was positive in all the sectors, though with
having an independent retreader carry out retread work. appreciable variations by region (ranging from [...]
Dealers have to purchase new tyres, such purchases in 1995),
account for a considerable proportion of their turnover,
and truck tyres, a market on which Michelin has a
dominant position, represent a large percentage of such
— at the end of some years, a reducing coefficient,turnover. Consequently, any rebate lost on that market
established by Michelin, was applied. In the case ofis of vital importance to dealers, all the more so if, as in
truck tyres, the reducing coefficient was 2 % inthis instance, the whole of the turnover with Michelin is
1992, 8 % in 1994, 0 % in 1994 and 1995 andaffected.
8 % in 1996,
— exceptionally, correction of the figures obtained to
take account of any circumstances increasing or(259) The service bonus was abolished in 1997.
decreasing the dealer’s purchasing capacity could
be applied (for example, the establishment of a
competing distributor in the area, the acquisition
or loss of a customer with strong potential, a
decision on the part of the retailer to stop purchas-
ing imports, etc.). Though requested to do so by(c) The progress bonus
the Commission, Michelin did not provide a list of
the firms concerned and of the factors which led to
such corrections.
(260) This bonus, like the ‘achieved-target bonus’ which
replaced it in 1997 and 1998, was particularly abusive
since, in order to obtain it, the dealer had to commit
(263) This individualised bonus corresponds exactly to whathimself to a minimum amount of purchases (called the Court ruled against in the abovementioned Michelinthe base) corresponding either to the previous year’s judgment. An undertaking in a dominant positionpurchases or to the average of the last two or three years cannot require dealers to exceed, each year, their figures(with adjustments in coefficients). for the previous years and thus automatically increase
its market shares by taking advantage of its dominant
position.
(261) The spirit of the system is summed up in a circular to
the Michelin sales force issued in January 1995, which
states that ‘[...]’. (264) Here again, the bonus was unfair, because of the
requirement imposed by Michelin to increase purchases
and because of the insecurity brought about by the
individualised determination of the minimum base. The
bonus was also loyalty-inducing and market-partitioning
since it applied only to purchases made from Michelin(262) However, the practice sometimes went further than
simply requiring the dealer to increase purchases: Miche- France.
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Unfairness of the minimum established in the base. The incentive
to exceed the base by 20 % was even stronger, since the
dealer was then entitled to rebates ranging from 2 % to
2,5 % of his total annual turnover with Michelin.
(265) The progress bonus was unfair since, though it appeared
to be based on an agreement, it amounted in fact to a
requirement unilaterally imposed by the manufacturer (269) The end-of-year pressure on dealers whose purchase
to increase purchases of Michelin tyres on the market. volumes had enabled them to sign a commercial agree-
ment was also very marked during the period examined.
In addition to the steps in the quantity rebates, the
progress bonus enabled them to obtain large additional,
progressive rebates, merely as a result of achieving or
exceeding the base. Achieving the base meant obtaining(266) The progress bonus made it possible to obtain annual
1 % of the ‘truck/earthmover/forklift/light plant’ turnoverrebates, provided that an individual objective (the base)
by way of ‘support for industrial products’ (42). Exceedingestablished by reference to the specific situation of each
the base entitled the dealer to progressive rebates of updealer (in particular, previous purchase figures) was
to 3 % of the figure if the base was exceeded by 15 %.exceeded. As a result, two dealers who during the year
had purchased the same quantities in absolute terms
could obtain very different rebates depending on the
initial base, the method chosen by Michelin to calculate
the base and what was agreed in subsequent nego- (270) In its reply to the statement of objections, Michelin
tiations. Since the criteria for establishing the bases were argues that the loyalty-inducing effect did not arise in
neither applied uniformly nor known in advance by practice since ‘in less than 5 % of cases was the base
dealers, and given Michelin’s clear influence on the agreed for a given year greater than the base and outturn
final determination of the base, the system involved a figures for the previous year’. The Commission notes
manifest factor of insecurity and allowed discrimination here that Michelin is including dealers for all types of
between dealers which must be regarded as unfair. tyres combined, which distorts the calculation of any
ratio and clearly does not provide a basis for refuting the
abuse.
Loyalty-inducing effect
Market-partitioning effect
(267) The progress bonus also had a marked loyalty-inducing (271) The progress bonus, like the quantity rebates, also had a
effect. Once the purchase-increase target was set, it highly market-partitioning effect since only purchases
became crucial for the dealer to meet the target, which made from Michelin France were taken into account.
in practice deprived him of the option of obtaining his
supplies to any significant extent from other suppliers.
Dealers who had committed themselves to exceeding a
‘minimum base’ (minimum purchase targets) at the end
of the year were bound by this in two respects. Firstly, (d) The commercial agreements
at the start of the year, since the minimum base included
a number of steps, with a commitment to purchase
greater quantities entitling the dealer to higher rebates.
Secondly, at the end of the year, to exceed the minimum
(272) These agreements were an extension of the quantityset and to exceed it by as large an amount as possible
rebate and progress bonus scheme with additional(up to 25 %), since the size of the rebates that could be
rebates (several % of turnover). They reinforce theobtained, while potentially certainly very large, depended
abusive nature of the other bonuses with a clauseon the degree to which the base was exceeded.
requiring FRF 24 million (between 1991 and 1994)
minimum turnover with Michelin, enabling Michelin to
be assured of cooperation on the part of the main
dealers.
(268) As from 1995, the end-of-year pressure increased con-
siderably. If he achieved the base, the dealer obtained
not only a rebate of 0,5 % on the total amount of truck/
earthmover tyres purchased, but also continued to
receive bonuses of 12 % to 15 % on purchases in excess (42) As from 1993.
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(273) The individual commercial cooperation agreements regarding increased sales on the market which, given the
market’s maturity, in fact amounted to the establishmentwere, for the largest dealers signing them, merely an
extension of the steps in the scale associated with the of a relationship of virtual exclusivity.
quantity rebates and progess bonus. In this respect, they
involve the same types of abuse, and the prospect of
being able to sign a commercial agreement increased the
pressure on the large dealers who had reached the top
(278) The unfairness of the system was also reinforced by theof the rebate scales. These agreements must also there- margin of subjectivity in determining the level of thefore be regarded as abusive. progress bonus and the service bonus, enabling Michelin
to use these tools as a means of exerting pressure.
Dealers were placed in a precarious position in the
negotiations on the targets, which took place before
rebates had been paid. It must be borne in mind that
Michelin was theoretically able, for example, to changeAdditional impact of the overlapping of practices:
the amount of some of the bonuses during the yearaggravated abusive nature of the ‘System’ formed
(‘service bonus’).by the general conditions of sale.
(279) Furthermore, through its overall operation, the system
(274) Over and above the fact that each of the elements resulted in uncertainty as to the final net price of the
making up the general conditions of sale constituted in product, a practice which is unacceptable when imposed
its own right an abusive practice in several respects, it is by an undertaking in a dominant position. Since most
important to note the extent to which the combination of the rebates were conditional, the dealer did not know
and interaction of the various conditions helped to the final unit price until the last day in February of the
reinforce their impact and thus the abusive nature of the year following that in which the purchase was made.
‘system’ considered as a whole. Each of the objections
will be looked at below to demonstrate how each of
these conditions contributed to this and how their
respective abusive effects combined with one another
(280) Since market trends are by definition uncertain, theand reinforced the effectiveness of the relevant practices.
dealer could not know in advance what quantities he
was likely to purchase during the year or whether or not
he would meet the targets he had committed himself to.
‘Overstocking’ was not a solution, since the storage of
tyres, which are bulky and costly in relation to the(275) In general, the mere fact that the combined effects of the
specialist dealers’ financial capacities, represents a sub-system forced specialist dealers in practice to ‘resell at a
stantial proportion of the dealers’ financing requirement.loss’ Michelin tyres to final consumers, their profit
It is therefore out of the question for a dealer tomargin being re-established only when they receive
‘overstock’ in the long term.payments of the various rebates, premiums and bonuses,
sometimes up to thirteen months after the date of the
transaction, proves the abusive nature of the system
under Article 82 of the Treaty. The fact that Michelin
was able to impose such a practice reveals the extent to
which it was able to use its position as a necessary The abusive elements of the new system (1997 to
partner and to distort competition between suppliers. 1998 inclusive)
(276) This situation imposed cash-flow problems and losses New truck tyres
on dealers while Michelin made a not inconsiderable
cash-flow gain that was not justified by any economic
service performed in return. Placing dealers in this
precarious financial situation reinforced the unfair natu-
(281) The new system introduced by Michelin in 1997 wasre of Michelin’s relations with dealers.
based essentially on invoice rebates and on an achieved-
target bonus. Although the invoice rebates seemed to
differ quite distinctly from the practice of quantity
rebates and to put less pressure on dealers, they still, as
will be demonstrated, involved some abuse. The new(277) Consequently, by making use of the fact that dealers had
become economically dependent on the rebates paid ‘achieved-target bonus’ which was a sort of substitute
for the ‘progress bonus’, still tended to tie the dealerafter purchases had been made, Michelin was able, under
the cover of ‘agreements’, to impose certain requirements closely to the manufacturer in an abusive manner.
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(i) I n v o i c e r e b a t e s small, during a given year could affect the dealer’s profit
margin on sales of Michelin truck tyres for the whole
year. This created substantial pressure to achieve Miche-
lin’s sales targets and was liable to prevent dealers from
selecting the most favourable source of supply and made(282) The invoice rebate system which replaced the former
it more difficult for competitors to enter the market.quantity rebate system appeared to be less unfair and
less loyalty-inducing since it ‘automatically’ granted the
dealer a rebate which was dependent on his previous
performance, i.e. on the previous year, or on the average
of the two or even three previous years, whichever
(288) This was all the more the case as almost all the factorswas more favourable to the dealers. Nevertheless, this
helping to increase the pressure on dealers under thepractice must still be regarded as abusive, since it had a
‘progress bonus’ were in evidence here too:loyalty-inducing effect in several respects.
— the rebate percentages were always substantial (2 %
of invoiced net turnover in 1997, 1,5% in 1998),(283) Firstly, since the amount of the rebates was proportional
to the figures for the previous years, there was always a
loyalty-inducing effect, since any additional purchase of
Michelin products could enable the dealer to obtain a — the difference between Michelin’s position and that
higher invoice rebate rate the following year. of its main competitors remained considerable,
— Michelin’s representatives were omnipresent.(284) Secondly, if the dealer’s purchases for the current year
would have allowed him to claim a higher invoice rebate
rate than the rate applied during the year, the dealer
received an ‘end-of-year adjustment’ equivalent to the
rate differential. The loyalty-inducing effect thus also
(289) Furthermore, the dealer could not set his ‘target’ himself.applied within a given year.
It iwas established on the basis of the ‘dealer’s potential’
(i.e. his performance in previous years) and the antici-
pated trend on the market. Michelin gave the dealer the
choice between his figures for the previous year and the
(285) Thirdly, for a given level of invoice rebate (15 %, 16 %, average for the last two or three years, adjusted to take
etc.), an ‘end-of-year rebate’ (not to be confused with the account of the anticipated growth trend on the market
‘end-of-year adjustment’) was paid, its rate ranging from (1 % in 1997). This already created a loyalty-inducing
0 % to 3 % in line with the relevant rebate level and the effect, since, if he wished to obtain the bonus, the dealer
net turnover invoiced. Thus, within a given invoice clearly could not go below his performance figures for
rebate rate, the end-of-year rebate depended on the level the previous year or years. Thus, if he was a long-
of sales of Michelin products during the current year. established Michelin customer, he could not cut his
The loyalty-inducing effect was thus further reinforced. purchases in half if he wished, for example, to change
supplier or try out other products. He could perhaps
reduce his purchases slightly, but never significantly.
(ii) T h e a c h i e v e d - t a r g e t b o n u s
(290) In fact, even this last option was difficult to put into
practice. The system gave the dealer a strong incentive
(286) This new bonus made it possible to obtain an amount to choose the highest target amongst the three options
corresponding to a percentage of net annual turnover offered to him, which considerably reinforced the loy-
invoiced (2 % in 1997 and 1,5 % in 1998) if the target alty-inducing effect.
was achieved. Achieving the target also entitled the
dealer to the PRO bonus (only for 1997).
(291) It must not be forgotten that, while the invoice rebate
rate was established on the basis of the three possible(287) It is inherent in any system of rebates granted on the
basis of quantities sold during a relatively long reference ways of defining the reference base, it was also deter-
mined ‘on the basis of the solution which is mostperiod that pressure increases on the purchaser, at the
end of the reference period, to achieve the level of favourable to the dealer’. The rebate was thus calculated
on the basis of the option which corresponded to thepurchases necessary for obtaining the rebate. Variations
in the rate of rebate as a result of one last order, even if highest number of tyres purchased. Thus, for example,
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if in 1996 a dealer had sold 1 084 tyres, his average for on dealers, particularly at the end of the period, in such
a way as to restrict their choice of sources of supply and1996/1995 being 945 and that for 1996/1995/1994
being 868, it was the first option (1996, 1 084 tyres) to impede other producers’ access to the market, without
this being based on any economically justified quid prowhich was automatically applied.
quo. These rebates must therefore be regarded as an
abuse within the meaning of Article 82. In 1998, the
end-of-year quantity rebates were abolished from the
general conditions, but continued to apply under the(292) If the dealer signed a more ambitious ‘target contract’
enabling him to move up to a higher section of the grid, commercial agreements.
he could obtain a higher invoice rebate. However, this
worked both ways: if the dealer opted for a ‘target’ which
was lower than the figure set, he was liable to see a
reduction in his ‘invoice rebate’, since he ran the risk of
2. THE PRO AGREEMENT (‘AGREEMENT FOR OPTIMUMmoving down the grid. Taking the previous example,
USE OF MICHELIN TRUCK TYRES’)selecting a different option (the average for 1996/
1995 or 1996/1995/1994) would have meant a loss on
the invoice rebate, which would have fallen from 17 %
to 16,5 %, since the position on the grid would have
(297) Introduced in 1993, this bonus was conditional uponbeen lower.
signature of a PRO agreement and upon having already
earned a progress bonus (or, as from 1997, an achieved-
target bonus). A requirement was that Michelin casings
had to be sent for retreading to Michelin exclusively. A(293) The dealer also risked obtaining a lower rate on the end-
bonus was granted for each casing presented.of-year rebate. The invoice rebate rate was one of the
criteria included in calculation of the end-of-year rebate
rate. Thus, in 1997, a dealer in the 16,5 % section could
obtain an end-of-year ranging from 1,5 % to 2,5 %,
whereas a reseller in the 17 % section could obtain a rate (298) This bonus clearly had a double tied-sales effect: in the
ranging from 2 % to 3 %. first place, Michelin was using its dominant position on
the market for new tyres to enhance its position on
the retread market. Secondly, Michelin was using its
dominant position on the retread market to strengthen
(294) The result naturally was that the dealer was prompted its position on the new tyre market:
to choose a ‘target’ which would ‘if possible’, enable him
to obtain a higher invoice rebate, and one which would
not at all events cause him to loose the rebate to which — in order to obtain the bonus, it was necessary to
he was entitled on the basis of his previous purchase sign a progress bonus commitment,
figures. Consequently, the dealer’s choice was severely
limited, to Michelin’s advantage: the dealer rarely opted
for a ‘target’ which was lower than the figure used in — the number of PRO bonuses was limited by the
calculating the invoice rebate. However, such figure was number of new tyres purchased.
the one corresponding to the highest figure for purchases
from Michelin.
(299) In addition, this bonus was market-partitioning since it
was limited to purchases made in France and since the(295) It may be concluded from all these considerations that
retreading of casings outside France, even by a Michelinthe achieved-target bonus was in itself abusive within
subsidiary, meant the loss of the PRO bonus for thethe meaning of Article 82 of the Treaty since it was
relevant casings.unfair and loyalty-inducing.
Abusive character of the PRO agreementRetreads
(296) In 1997, Michelin maintained the practice of quantity
Tied or conditional salesrebates, consisting of progressive rebates in line with
purchases made during the year. The practice was very
similar to that which had previously existed and, since
the circumstances were almost identical, it must be
regarded in the same light. Any such practice imposed (300) The PRO agreement adversely affected competition in
two ways. First (see paragraphs 301 to 303), Michelinby an undertaking in a dominant position puts pressure
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was using its dominant position on the market in new be retreaded. An exclusive dealing obligation can
therefore place a major obstacle in the way oftruck tyres as a lever to preserve or improve its position
on the neighbouring retreads market. The second effect Michelin’s competitors on the retread market.
(see paragraphs 304 et seq.) was the converse of the first
one: Michelin was using the retreads market, where it
was also dominant, to strengthen its position on the
market in new truck tyres.
(303) The situation is aggravated by the fact that Michelin is
already very strong on the retread market, with shares
close to [...]; its competitors have shares several times
smaller, and generally operate on the retread market
only. Unlike Michelin, therefore, they could not use
their new tyre business to support or strengthen their
retread business.(301) To qualify for the large rewards available under the
PRO bonus scheme, the dealer had to undertake
among other things to ‘to present his customers’ truck
tyres to Michelin for retreading when they have
reached the legal tread wear limit’ (clause in PRO
agreement). The exclusive character of this clause
appears to be confirmed when Michelin writes ‘given
(304) The other obligation entered into by a party to thethat their first REMIX retread is the retread best able PRO agreement concerned a ‘truck progress bonus’ forto preserve Michelin truck casings, and to restore them the current year. Bonuses were given on the basis ofto new tyre performance’; but in its reply to the the number of Michelin casings brought to Michelinstatement of objections Michelin says that there was for retreading, but in order to qualify for them theno exclusivity in practice, and that Michelin did not in dealer had to undertake to buy Michelin new truckfact require it. It cannot be denied, however, that the tyres. Here the manufacturer was using retreading as aexistence of such a clause was a natural inducement lever to guarantee sales on the market in new tyres.to dealers to send all their tyre carcasses to Michelin,
even where it might not have been justified by the
economic circumstances. This reduced the supply of
Michelin carcasses to other undertakings, which in
some cases might be operating exclusively in the
retreads business. In its reply to the statement of
objections Michelin estimates that it succeeded in (305) As noted above, the progress bonus obliged the dealer
collecting only ‘[...] of new tyres sold’, but adds ‘in to achieve a level of purchases of new truck tyres
Europe’. Leaving aside the difficulty of measuring such determined by reference to his specific circumstances,
a figure with any precision, a rate as low as this would ‘depending on past performance and future prospects’;
be inconceivable in France, where Michelin sells [...] of it comprised a number of mechanisms that tended to
original equipment truck tyres and about [...] of new bind dealers to the manufacturer and to ensure their
replacements, and retreads about [...] of the market. loyalty.
Clearly France is a very special market, because
Michelin retreads more tyres than it sells, so that it
must be able to collect and retread not only almost all
of its own new tyres but also a large number of its
competitors’ tyres. This special feature of the French
market may well be due to the abusive character of
the first retread clause just described. (306) In addition, the rewards the dealer could obtain under
the PRO agreement were restricted by the number of
truck and earthmover tyres bought from Michelin in
the previous year. Dealers who had bought 1 000 new
tyres in the previous year would receive a bonus on
no more than 1 000 retreaded tyres, no matter what
quantity they actually sent for retreading. If they
wanted to obtain these bonuses, it was to their
advantage not just to buy new Michelin tyres, without
which they would not be entitled to the bonus, but to(302) The repercussions were particularly serious, because
Michelin truck carcasses made up not only a large buy as many new Michelin tyres as possible. The
reward could then be very big, because next year theypercentage of heavy tyres in general, but an even
larger percentage of total retreadable carcasses. Bottom- could obtain a substantial discount on every tyre sent
for retreading. This left them even more deeplyof-range tyres are very often not retreadable; Michelin
tyres differ from a large proportion of the competing committed to increasing sales of Michelin products
and ever-closer links with Michelin.brands in that they are specially designed in order to
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(307) If in the course of a year a dealer wanted to promote a the number of new tyres bought during either the
previous year or the current year. Michelin was heredifferent new replacement tyre, and hence to change
supplier, he had to be aware that the rewards under the making the conclusion of the agreement subject to
acceptance by the dealers of supplementary obligationsPRO scheme would fall dramatically the following year,
because the number of bonuses granted on carcasses which, by their nature and according to commercial
usage, had no connection with subject of the agreement.was in any event restricted to the number of new tyres
bought the previous year. The dealer was therefore under This constitutes an abuse within the meaning of point (d)
of the second paragraph of Article 82 of the Treaty.strong pressure to continue buying new tyres from
Michelin. The effect was to rigidify the distribution of
new replacement tyres.
(311) The two clauses just described were removed in 1998,
and the PRO agreement was replaced by the carcass
quality service clause, which eliminated the abusive
components in the system.(308) Towards the end of 1994 an additional clause (avenant)
was added to the agreement which strengthened the
lever effect still further. Dealers whose purchases of
truck and earthmover tyres had increased by more than
25 % in 1994 by comparison with 1993, and who
had achieved the commercial target promised at the
Compartmentalising the marketbeginning of the year, were now to be covered by an
‘exceptional PRO clause’. Under this arrangement the
quantity of retreadable casings sent in 1994 on which
they could qualify for the PRO bonus was equal to the
number of new truck and earthmover tyres bought from
Michelin in the same year. Thus additional bonuses (312) It has already been shown that Michelin’s commercial
could now be obtained without regard to the number of policy, and especially the end-of-year rebates, isolated
new tyres bought the previous year; but some conditions the French market and gave dealers a strong incentive to
did not change. The bonuses were still linked to have all their retreading carried out by Michelin France.
purchases of new tyres, though now in the current year The PRO bonus strengthened this partitioning effect,
rather than the previous year, and, more importantly, contrary to Article 82 of the Treaty. The bonuses
the dealer had to increase purchases of truck tyres from obtained under the PRO agreement were calculated in
Michelin quite substantially, and to comply with the proportion to the volume of new tyres bought from
commitments given. The overall effect, therefore, was to Michelin France. To qualify for these bonuses, dealers
strengthen the incentive, and in any event to assure were required to buy new tyres from Michelin in France,
Michelin that the dealer was tied into the progress bonus and to send the carcasses to Michelin for retreading. This
mechanism, on the basis of high volumes. placed a barrier in the way of any purchase of new tyres
abroad, because a dealer who did buy any volume
abroad would have to forgo the retread bonus on that
volume. Sending Michelin casings abroad for retreading
would have had the same effect, because the bonus
would be lost even if they were sent to another Michelin
subsidiary. Thus it was also made impossible to send(309) There was a similar effect on new dealers, who in the
tyres abroad.nature of things had not made any purchases the year
before. Up to 1996 they were not entitled to this
bonus. In 1996 Michelin amended the agreement, and
introduced an exception for new arrivals so that the
maximum sums to be obtained could be determined by
reference to the purchases provided for in the progress (313) Bearing in mind that Michelin casings are by far the
bonus scheme. This did not change the abusive effect, most common on the market, and the casings which are
because, as has been shown, the progress bonus scheme easiest to retread, there can be no doubt that the
itself provided for a bonus which bound the dealers partitioning effect of this policy was appreciable.
closely to Michelin and rigidified Michelin’s position.
(314) In its reply to the statement of objections Michelin says
only that ‘for tax purposes Michelin would not have
been able to justify the granting of a bonus under the(310) The bonus was concerned with retreading, and was
based on the number of tyres sent to Michelin for PRO to a dealer who sent a casing to a related company
located abroad’. Michelin here seeks to justify theretreading during the current year, so that there would
not appear to be any justification for making it depen- partitioning effect of the bonus by referring to its tax
obligations. The Commission has not sought to establishdent on the purchase of new tyres, or for limiting it to
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whether or not this statement is true in tax terms; the but certainly at around [...] of sales on the new tyre
market. The effects are similar to those of a fidelityCommission takes the view that an undertaking holding
a dominant position has a responsibility to ensure that clause: the dealer enjoys the many advantages of belong-
ing to the Club, but in return must remain faithful toit does not create a system that partitions national
markets, even if that means putting an end to a bonus Michelin. A practice of this kind certainly bears no direct
relation to any real cost savings to the manufacturer,available domestically.
and as Michelin has a dominant position on the market
it can only be a barrier to whatever competition still
exists there.
3. THE BUSINESS COOPERATION AND SERVICE ASSIST-
ANCE AGREEMENT (THE MICHELIN FRIENDS CLUB)
(319) There is considerable evidence to show that the tempera-(315) The main purpose of the Club agreement was to attract ture condition was central, and that the Michelin marketthe largest dealers. The obligation to ensure that a certain share considered necessary was around [...]. First, theproportion of one’s sales was composed of Michelin average share of Michelin tyres in sales by Club membersproducts, a proportion known as the ‘temperature’, was in Europe is [...]; the corresponding figure for indepen-not spelt out in the agreements themselves, but this dent specialised dealers is only [...]; for the Euromasterobligation was a real one, and is evidenced in the network, which is actually controlled by Michelin, itpapers assembled during the inspections carried out on is only [...]. Second, numerous documents found onMichelin’s premises. An internal Club document, for Michelin’s premises speak by implication of this marketexample, says that [...]. Other documents mention a share obligation as a condition of entry to the Club andthreshold of [...] Michelin products for trucks. of continued membership thereafter (43). At the hearing
Michelin stated that more than 47 % of the Club dealers
did not meet these temperature conditions. This figure
is somewhat strange, to say the least, because if the
(316) Apart from the unfair foreclosure effect produced by temperature does correspond to the average of sales,
this threshold, mention should also be made of the then 53 % of dealers must have been exceeding their
obligation not to divert spontaneous customer demand temperature quite substantially in order to offset the
away from Michelin products which was written into temperature shortfall of the 47 % referred to by Michelin.
the cooperation agreement until October 1995.
Abusive aspects of the Club
(320) This is aggravated by the fact that Michelin already had
an integrated network on the market which ensured it
very large market shares. Once the two networks were
added together, there was a ratchet effect that ensured
(317) 1. The Club was used by Michelin as a tool for rigidifying that Michelin’s market shares would hold steady andor indeed improving its position on the market in new even increase in a large proportion of the truck tyrereplacement truck tyres. One of the formal obligations trade in France (more than [...] of the total trade in newon the dealer was to promote the Michelin brand and tyres, and more than [...] of the trade in retreaded tyres,not to divert spontaneous customer demand away from all brands together), while at the same time the truckMichelin tyres. In some Club agreements Michelin tyre trade was itself bound to Michelin for a largeexpressly says that it reserves the right to monitor proportion of its sales.compliance with this clause. Spontaneous demand for
Michelin products is very high, so that an obligation of
this kind must necessarily be considered abusive, as it is
aimed directly at eliminating competition on the part of
other manufacturers, guaranteeing the maintenance of
Michelin’s position, and limiting competition on the
market.
(43) In the minutes of a commercial meeting with a customer, the
Michelin representative writes: ‘[...]’ (inspection of 12 June 1997).
In other minutes, on the subject of entry to the Club, the Michelin
representative writes, ‘[...]’ (inspection of 12 June 1997). A
(318) In practice the situation is even worse, because this manuscript paper of 30 January 1996 refers to the market share
clause became an obligation on the dealer to guarantee thresholds needed for entry to the Club: [...] (inspection of
a certain market share for Michelin products (the 12 June 1997). Lastly, in view of the advantage of continued
Michelin ‘temperature’), probably at a level varying from relations with a strategic dealer, a representative proposes that
generosity should be shown: ‘[...]’.one dealer to another and from one region to another,
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(321) 2. That Michelin did indeed set out to oblige the advantages will be withheld. The dealer must take part
in numerous promotion programmes, notably for truckmembers of its club to guarantee a Michelin ‘tempera-
ture’ is also shown by the clause in the agreement tyres, and use Michelin signs and advertising. The dealer’s
staff is to be trained at the Michelin training centre. Allrequiring the dealer to ‘carry a sufficient stock of
Michelin products to meet any customer demand aspects of the business, and investments in particular,
are inevitably influenced by Michelin’s wishes.immediately’. It is expressly stated there that an individu-
alised stock grid may be drawn up ‘which takes account
of the local, regional and national market segments’, and
which is to be expressed ‘in percentage form’. It would
seem, then, that this grid is to be drawn up on the basis
of Michelin market shares, or at the very least on the
(325) From a commercial point of view, finally, the obligationbasis of the shares Michelin would like to achieve. This
on the dealer to keep Michelin informed of the dealer’scan only induce dealers to guarantee Michelin those
statistics and sales forecasts, category by category for allshares, and to limit access to the market by other
brands, and of the development of Michelin’s marketcompetitors. Dealers, after all, have no interest in
share, entitles Michelin to monitor the dealer’s commer-keeping stocks which they cannot or do not want to sell.
cial policy. As Michelin has a large sales force withThey will not buy competing goods as long as they have
instructions to assemble this information, the dealerMichelin products in stock. But as a result of this clause
can never decide to sell competing products withoutthey always will have a stock of Michelin products ‘in a
Michelin being aware of the fact: and membership of thevolume that matches Michelin’s market share’, and not
Club requires a spirit of partnership and observance ofin a volume that matches their own wishes. There is
Michelin volumes and the Michelin ‘temperature’.consequently a barrier to entry by other manufacturers,
and Michelin’s own market shares are rigidified.
(326) This leaves the dealer completely dependent on Michelin,
so that there is necessarily a loyalty-inducing effect. Any
(322) 3. The Club agreement binds dealers by a series of change in the dealer’s commercial or strategic policy
obligations which allow Michelin an exceptionally far- would leave him open to reprisals on the part of
reaching right to monitor the activities of the members, Michelin. Certainly the members of the Club all shared
and which do not appear to be in any way justified the feeling that there could be no turning back. It would
otherwise than by Michelin’s desire to supervise distri- be very difficult for members of the Club to give up not
bution in detail. Conduct on the part of an undertaking just the financial contributions but also the know-how
holding a dominant position which has the object or they have obtained with the help of the dominant
effect of binding dealers closely to it in organisational manufacturer. Indeed when the first firms signed the
and commercial terms can only increase their depen- agreement it was quite impossible to leave, as they
dence, which constitutes an abuse within the scope of would have been required to repay all the sums received
Article 82 of the Treaty. in financial contribution. The commitment they had
entered into could fairly be described as a lifetime one.
(323) This is true of the obligation to supply Michelin with
(327) The benefits to Michelin, on the other hand, weredetailed financial information, or the obligation to keep
considerable. In its dealings with the trade in general,Michelin informed of the identities of all the partners or
Michelin was being given reliable statistics on develop-shareholders in the business and of any circumstance
ments on the market. In its dealings with the individualwhich might affect control of the company and its
dealers, Michelin was fully informed at all times of thestrategic choices. Every aspect of the dealer’s financing
financial position of its customers, so that it could adaptand strategy becomes an open book to Michelin, which
its marketing pressure or the financial benefits it wasregularly holds meetings with dealers to discuss their
granting. It could also satisfy itself that dealers werefinances and to advise them on their financial affairs.
buying faithfully from Michelin and did not intend to
join another network.
(324) Michelin’s influence over the organisation of the dealer’s
business does not end there. The dealer must promise (328) The dealer was therefore closely bound to the manufac-
turer in terms of finance, organisation and marketing, inMichelin to carry out a wide-ranging outlet audit, and
above all must accept a list of areas for progress a manner that clearly constitutes abuse within the
meaning of Article 82 of the Treaty.suggested by Michelin; otherwise the promised financial
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(329) 4. Lastly, until October 1995 the Business Cooperation 93, T-26/93 and T-28/93 Compagnie Maritime Belge
Transports v Commission (44), that ‘where one or moreand Service Assistance Agreement expressly required the
dealer to have the first retread of Michelin truck and undertakings in a dominant position actually implement
a practice whose aim is to remove a competitor, the factearthmover casings carried out by Michelin. Michelin
states that it did not formally require compliance with that the result sought is not achieved is not enough to
avoid the practice being characterised as an abuse of athis clause, but in fact the great majority of retreads for
Club dealers were carried out by Michelin, and this dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of
the Treaty’. If in the present case the intention of thecontinued after 1996. It has already been explained by
way of example that in one case Michelin threatened to dominant undertaking was significantly to increase
market shares, and that result was not achieved, therefuse entry to the Club to dealers who wished to
cooperate with competing retreaders. conduct at issue could constitute abuse nevertheless.
That conduct might still have helped to maintain or
stabilise Michelin’s market shares.
(330) These are forms of exclusive dealing with effects anal-
ogous to those of tied sales, and must therefore be
considered to constitute abuse within the meaning of (334) In the NBIM judgment the Court of Justice found
Article 82 of the Treaty. that ‘temporary unprofitability or even losses are not
inconsistent with the existence of a dominant position.
By the same token, the fact that the prices charged by
Michelin NV do not constitute an abuse and are not
even particularly high does not justify the conclusion
that a dominant position does not exist.’(331) This is because dealers are under pressure to send their
carcasses to Michelin: they will be reluctant to endanger
their partnership with Michelin, with all the advantages
it brings for the whole of their business, over a question
of retreading, which is in any event a minor part of their
tyres business as a whole. Thus the dealer’s choice is
(335) In addition, the question whether an undertaking holdsbeing restricted: the dealer will not be able to have
a dominant position within the meaning of Article 82Michelin casings retreaded by other retreaders, and the
of the Treaty has to be considered in relation to theother retreaders are faced with an obstacle barring their
period in which the conduct at issue is observed.access to this market.
Throughout the period in question, and in earlier years
too, Michelin always satisfied the market share test
developed by the Court of Justice.
Further arguments put forward by Michelin
(336) Lastly, Michelin’s statement of the facts is itself extremely
disputable. As regards the retread market, it is remark-
able that over so long a period, from 1980 to today,
Michelin should have maintained such high market
(332) In its reply to the statement of objections Michelin shares, falling by only [...] percentage points, from [...]
puts forward two general arguments to counter the of the market. It did this at a time when its market shares
Commission’s objections. It says that in the space of in other Member States were very much lower. Michelin
20 years its shares of the market in new replacement estimates that its shares of the market in new replace-
tyres have fallen from [...], and that it has seen a ment tyres have fallen from [...]. But according to
substantial fall on the market in retreaded tyres too; and information supplied by Michelin itself the Michelin
it states that the prices of truck tyres have fallen by more group’s market shares oscillated between [...] between
than [...] in ten years, after allowing for inflation. These 1990 and 1997, beginning at [...] in 1990 and standing
falls, Michelin argues, prove that Michelin does not hold at [...] in 1997. These figures alone would demonstrate
a dominant position and has not abused one. Michelin’s capacity to maintain its market shares, at least
during the 1990s. If Michelin did indeed see its market
(333) The Commission would point out first of all that the
Court of First Instance of the European Communities
has held, in its judgment in Joined Cases T-24/93, T-25/ (44) [1996] ECR II-1201.
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shares fall, the fall must have taken place essentially in (342) According to the answer to a request for information
sent to Michelin, however, Michelin did suffer a fall inthe 1980s, and was presumably the result of the ending
of Michelin’s exclusive rights in respect of radial tyres (45). prices, but over the period in question the fall, calculated
on the basis of the truck tyres range weighted by the
average discount allowed to dealers, was limited to [...]
before allowance for inflation, so that the best that can(337) Turning to the fall in prices, Michelin asserts, carefully,
be said is that the fall kept Michelin in line with thethat prices for truck tyres fell by [...] over the ten years,
market.without going into more detail regarding Michelin’s own
prices.
(338) The data obtained by the Commission from INSEE, (343) The conclusion is that like the rest of the market
the French National Economic Studies and Statistical Michelin incorporated the fall in raw material prices
Institute, confirm that there was a fall in prices for new into its own prices, while maintaining its initial price
replacement tyres on the French market. From an index differential.
figure of 104 in 1991 prices had fallen to a figure of
92 by 1998 before allowance for inflation.
(339) But INSEE attributes this fall to the drop in market prices
D. EFFECT ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATESfor hydrocarbons and rubber, which are important
components in the cost of tyre manufacture, and
considers it similar to what happened on other markets
related to the motor industry.
(344) In its judgment in Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière
v Maschinenbau Ulm (47) the Court of Justice held that
(340) Despite what appears to have been an unpromising anticompetitive conduct affects trade between Member
market, Michelin succeeded in maintaining its prices, or States if ‘having regard to what can reasonably be
even increasing them fairly substantially for certain types foreseen, it is to be feared that it might have an influence,
of truck tyre. The following table is based on data sent direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of
by INSEE and Michelin (46); it shows quite clearly that trade between Member States capable of preventing the
Michelin managed to maintain its prices even while the realization of a single market between the said States.’
market was collapsing.
(345) In the NBIM judgment the Court said that ‘when the
Table 24 holder of a dominant position obstructs access to the
market by competitors it makes no difference whether
such conduct is confined to a single Member State asYear Michelin Market Inflation
long as it is capable of affecting patterns of trade and
competition on the common market’ (48).
1991 100 100 100
1992 [...] 102,8971 102,3712
1993 [...] 102,0682 104,4762 (346) The discount system applied by Michelin may affect
trade between Member States, since, by establishing
1994 [...] 92,55605 106,315 strong links between the dominant supplier and the
dealers, it restricts the dealers’ scope in making their
1995 [...] 91,67193 108,1122 purchases. Michelin’s entire system is aimed at improv-
ing the dealers’ performance in its own favour and
1996 [...] 92,4929 110,3253 thus at preventing other manufacturers from obtaining
orders. Many of these manufacturers are established in
the common market and have large plants which
produce heavy tyres. Their chances of penetrating the
(341) In its letter of 25 July 2000 Michelin contested the French market are diminished since, on account of the
validity of this analysis, saying that in the years 1991 to links established between manufacturers and dealers by
1996 Michelin’s prices had been going through a phase Michelin’s system of commercial terms, Michelin’s
of catching up.
(45) As the inventor of the radial tyre, Michelin held a patent
protecting it from competition from other manufacturers in the
1970s and early 1980s. (47) [1966] ECR 235.
(48) Loc. cit. (see footnote 15), at paragraph 103.(46) Michelin’s catalogue prices for sales to specialised dealers.
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market share is more or less fixed, and in consequence F. ARTICLE 15 OF REGULATION No 17
other manufacturers’ penetration of the French market
cannot exceed a small percentage. The conduct on the
part of Michelin which is at issue, and its consequent
maintenance of its market share, is accordingly liable to
(351) Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 states that therestrict freedom of trade between Member States in a
Commission may, by decision, impose on undertakingsway that harms the achievement of the objective of
or associations of undertakings fines not exceeding 10 %establishing a single market, in particular by changing
of the turnover in the preceding business year of each ofthe structure of competition within the common market.
the undertakings participating in the infringement
where, either intentionally or negligently, they infringe
Article 82 of the Treaty. In fixing the amount of the fine,
regard is to be had both to the gravity and to the
duration of the infringement.(347) The unfavourable effects of the abusive discount system
on trade between Member States are appreciable. The
evidence shows that even quite small rebates could be
considered significant by the dealers. The dealers were
faced with an invidious choice between making sales
(352) In the present case it is clear that Michelin committedefforts for the other manufacturers or for Michelin and
the infringement intentionally, because, as is explainedit was only natural for the dealers to try to increase their in paragraph 361, the Commission fined Michelin forMichelin sales — inevitably at the expense of the other
the same practices in 1981, and that decision was upheldmanufacturers because the uncertain and individualised
by the Court of Justice in 1983. Michelin has a verybonus could well turn out to be better than the (known)
large legal department, which could not be unaware thatrebate available from other manufacturers. In this way,
these practices constituted an infringement, especially asthe task of those other manufacturers trying to sell into
the Court had ruled against the same conduct on aFrance from other Community countries was made
neighbouring geographic market.noticeably more difficult by the action of the dominant
undertaking.
(353) In the present case Michelin’s conduct should be penal-
ised by the imposition of a fine. In order to determine
the appropriate level of the fine the Commission hasE. ARTICLE 3 OF REGULATION No 17
to take account of the gravity and duration of the
infringement and of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.
(348) Article 3 of Regulation No 17 states that, where
the Commission, upon application or upon its own
initiative, finds that there is infringement of Article 81
or Article 82 of the Treaty, it may by decision require 1. GRAVITY
the undertakings or associations of undertakings con-
cerned to bring such infringement to an end.
(354) The conduct in question consists of a system of loyalty-
inducing discounts of a kind consistently condemned in
(349) The Commission ought therefore to require Michelin to the past by the Commission and by the Community
bring the infringement described in Section C to an end, judicature; it is a serious abuse of a dominant position,
to the extent that it has not already done so, and aimed at eliminating or at the very least preventing the
henceforth to refrain from any agreement or behaviour growth of Michelin’s competitors on the French markets
which might have the same or a similar object or effect. in new replacement and retread truck tyres. Such
conduct must be considered a serious infringement of
Community competition law.
(350) It should be noted that in the course of 1998, in
exchanges of correspondence and meetings with the
Commission departments, Michelin discussed commit- (355) France is the only country in the Community where
Michelin holds a share of the market in retreaded tyresments it might enter into in order to bring the infringe-
ment to an end. At a meeting on 4 February 1999 which is greater than its share of the market in new
replacement tyres. The tying of sales of new andMichelin submitted agreements which had been
amended with effect from 1 January 1999 in order to retreaded tyres which is the effect of the progress bonus
and the PRO agreement may be considered at least onetake account of the Commission’s observations and to
put an end to the abuse. factor helping to explain this singular situation.
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(356) Michelin’s market shares are larger in France than they of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of
Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSCare in any other Member State. The situation might
indeed be due to the history of the brand, but the Treaty (50) expressly refer to repetition of the infringe-
ment as an aggravating circumstance justifying anstrength of the Michelin Friends Club on the French
market may also be a factor. The effect of the Club increase in the amount of the fine.
policy certainly helps to maintain Michelin’s market
share among the Club dealers, where its share is not
(362) Michelin argues that the fact that the Court’s earliersurprisingly much higher than it is among independent
judgment was concerned with an infringement onspecialised dealers.
another geographic market means that Michelin’s abus-
ive practices here do not constitute repetition of the
same infringement. The Commission takes the view,
however, that when a dominant undertaking has been(357) The infringement took place in a substantial part of the
censured by the Commission it has a responsibility notcommon market, and because of the partitioning of the
only to put an end to the abusive practices on thecommon market which it caused its effects extended
relevant market but also to ensure that its commercialbeyond the relevant market, which is the French market.
policy throughout the Community conforms to the
individual Decision notified to it; Michelin did not do
this, quite the reverse.
(358) For these reasons the amount of the fine imposed to
reflect the gravity of the infringement should be EUR
(363) It must be concluded that the abuses committed by8 million, reflecting the serious nature, extent and
Michelin on the defined relevant markets are aggravatedimpact of the infringement.
by the fact that this was a repeated infringement, which
justifies an increase of 50 % in the basic amount of the
fine, that is to say an increase of EUR 7,6 million.
2. DURATION
4. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
(359) The infringement extended over a period of 19 years or
(364) As indicated in Section E, Michelin submitted amend-more, since the commercial policy at issue was in
ments to its commercial policy in February 1999 whichoperation at least from 1980 onward, and as indicated
took effect on 1 January 1999, and which were aimedin Section E Michelin agreed to amend its agreements
at bringing the infringement to an end. The undertakingwith effect from 1 January 1999. But the Commission
had therefore made these amendments even before thehas concentrated its enquiries on the period 1990 to
Commission sent the statement of objections; this has1999, and accordingly it will take account here only of
to be considered a mitigating circumstance, justifying athe period from 1 January 1990 to 31 December 1998.
reduction of 20 % in the basic amount of the fine, thatFor purposes of this Decision, therefore, the duration of
is to say a reduction of EUR 3,04 million.the infringement is considered to be nine years.
5. AMOUNT OF THE FINE
(360) The amount of the fine to be imposed on the basis of
the gravity of the infringement should therefore be
increased by 90 % to take account of its duration. This (365) For these reasons the amount of the fine to be imposed
brings the basic amount of the fine to EUR 15,2 million. in respect of the infringement identified in this Decision
should be EUR 19,76 million,
3. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
(361) Michelin was fined by the Commission in 1981 in the
NBIM case, and that decision was upheld by the Court
in 1983 (49), for abuse of a dominant position of Article 1
the same kind, namely a system of loyalty-inducing
discounts. The Commission guidelines on the method
The Commission finds that, during a period extending from
1 January 1990 to 31 December 1998, Manufacture Française
(49) See footnote 15. (50) OJ C 9, 14.1.1998, p. 3.
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de Pneumatiques Michelin infringed Article 82 of the EC Article 3
Treaty by applying a system of loyalty-inducing rebates to
dealers in new replacement tyres and retreaded tyres for trucks Michelin shall refrain from repeating any conduct described in
and buses in France. Article 1, and from adopting any measure having equivalent
effect.
Article 4Article 2
This Decision is addressed to Manufacture Française de Pneu-
For the infringement referred to in Article 1, a fine of EUR matiques Michelin, F-63040 Clermont Ferrand.
19,76 million is hereby imposed on Michelin.
This Decision shall be enforceable pursuant to Article 256 ofThe fine shall be paid within three months of the date of
the EC Treaty.notification of this Decision into the following bank account:
Account No 642-0029000-95, Code SWIFT: BBVABEBB-
Code IBAN: BE76 6420 0290 0095, European Commission Done at Brussels, 20 June 2001.
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), Avenue des Arts/
Kunstlaan 43, B-1040 Brussels. After the expiry of that period,
For the Commissioninterest shall be automatically payable at the rate applied by
the European Central Bank to its main refinancing operations Mario MONTI
on the first working day of the month in which this Decision
is adopted, plus 3,5 percentage points, giving a total of 8,05 %. Member of the Commission
